行善义务与道德绑架新探  

A New Exploration of Duty to Do Good and Moral Kidnapping

作　　者：郑绍珉 ZHENG Shaomin(Institute of Moral Culture,Hunan Normal University,Changsha,Hunan 410081,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学道德文化研究院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2023年第8期81-89,共9页Journal of Yibin University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国传统动物伦理思想研究”(20BZX118)。

摘　　要：要求他人行善的行为通常被看作是要求他人行使道德上无义务或非完全义务的道德绑架行为。但在一些条件下的行善行为具有完全义务的特征,它与在道德上以禁令形式出现的完全义务并没有本质上的区别,且若实施对这种行善行为的强约束规定既不会不合理地侵犯他人的个人权利,也不会破坏可普遍化的道德原则标准。而当某种行善义务能够成为道德上的完全义务时,要求他人行善就并不总是构成道德上的绑架行为。The act of asking another person to do good is often seen as the act of moral kidnapping in which another person is asked to exercise no moral obligation or incomplete obligation.However,based on the investigation of the critics'opinions on the obligation to do good and moral abduction,it will be found that in some special cases,the act of doing good has the characteristics of complete obligation,which is not intrinsically different from the complete obligation in the form of moral prohibition.Imposing a strong constraint on such good deeds would neither unreasonably infringe upon the individual rights of others nor undermine universal standards of moral principle.And when a duty to do good can become a complete moral obligation,coercion of good will not always constitute a morally wrong kidnapping.

关 键 词：道德绑架 行善义务 个人权利 道德规范 

分 类 号：B8205[哲学宗教—伦理学]