基于博弈论的IT服务外包程度决策研究  

Research on IT Service Outsourcing Degree Decision Making Based on Game Theory

作　　者：刘晓宇 王长琼[2] LIU Xiaoyu;WANG Zhangqiong(School of Economics and Management,Hanjiang Normal University,Shiyan 442000,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]汉江师范学院经济与管理学院,湖北十堰442000 [2]武汉理工大学交通与物流工程学院,湖北武汉430063

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2023年第4期582-588,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

摘　　要：鉴于IT服务外包是企业增强核心竞争力的一种强有力战略手段,结合IT项目拆分理念,构建三阶段IT外包程度决策博弈模型,分析信息不对称条件下企业外包程度策略的选择及对应措施,并用数值仿真验证了不同参数对企业外包程度策略选择的影响。研究表明:企业IT项目模块自主开发成本、针对客户需求单次改进成本的增加会促使企业增大外包程度,而服务提供商风险规避度、参与模块开发的固定成本的增加会降低企业外包程度,并增加双方之间合同金额;服务提供商努力程度与IT项目模块质量溢价正相关;为保证外包企业最优等价确定性收益,任意外包程度下服务提供商最优等价确定性收益均为其机会成本。In view of IT service outsourcing is a powerful strategic means to enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises,combined with the concept of IT project splitting,a three-stage IT outsourcing degree decision-making game model was constructed.The selection and corresponding measures of ITO degree strategic choices under the condition of information asymmetry were analyzed,and the influence of different parameters on the ITO degree strategy choices was verified by numerical simulation.The research showed that:the increase of IT project module self-development cost and the single cost improvement for customer needs will promote the enterprise to increase the degree of outsourcing,while the increase in the risk aversion of service providers and the fixed cost of participating in module development will reduce the degree of outsourcing and increase the contract amount between the two parties.The degree of service provider's effort is positively correlated with the quality premium of IT project module;in order to ensure the optimal equivalent deterministic revenue of the outsourcing enterprise,the optimal equivalent deterministic revenue of the service provider under any ITO degree is its opportunity cost.

关 键 词：IT服务外包 外包程度决策 博弈论 信息不对称 IT项目拆分 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]