薪酬-级别倒挂与公司慈善捐赠  

Salary-Rank Inversion and Corporate Charitable Donations

作　　者：卢闯[1] 张文婷 焦焰 LU Chuang;ZHANG Wenting;JIAO Yan(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第5期73-83,共11页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“企业创新战略对公司财务决策的影响机理研究”(19BJY019)。

摘　　要：公司的慈善捐赠是直接增进社会福利的有效手段,探究公司捐赠决策的行为逻辑具有重要意义。基于2015—2019年国有企业集团下属A股上市公司数据,考察了公司高管获得高于其所属集团负责人薪酬的薪酬—级别倒挂现象对慈善捐赠的影响。研究发现:薪酬—级别倒挂会促使公司高管出于迎合集团的动机增加慈善捐赠,即薪酬—级别倒挂程度越高,公司的慈善捐赠水平越高。区分慈善捐赠性质的检验表明,薪酬—级别倒挂影响下的捐赠主要是非连续、策略性捐赠,支持了迎合假说。进一步分析发现,迎合动机强烈、迎合难度更高以及迎合效果更好时,薪酬—级别倒挂对公司慈善捐赠的影响更明显。因此,国有企业集团在激励下属公司积极承担社会责任时,可以将其相应的考核机制与薪酬体系结合,从而实现更好的激励效果。Corporate charitable donations serve as an effective means of directly enhancing social welfare,making it significant to explore the behavioral logic behind corporate donation decisions.This study leverages data from A-share listed companies affiliated with state-owned enterprise groups from 2015 to 2019 to explore how the phenomenon of“salary-rank inversion”,where the salary of executives surpasses that of group leaders,affects corporate charitable donations.The study finds that salary-rank inversion motivates corporate executives to increase charitable donations to cater to the groups.In other words,higher levels of salary-rank inversion lead to higher levels of corporate charitable donations.Upon distinguishing the nature of charitable donations,the examination reveals that donations under the influence of salary-rank inversion are mainly discontinuous and tactical,thus the hypothesis that companies cater to SOE groups is supported.Further analysis shows that the effect of salary-rank inversion on corporate charitable donations is more obvious when the motivation to cater to SOE groups is stronger,the difficulty of catering is higher,or the result of catering is better.As a result,when state-owned enterprise groups encourage their subsidiary companies to actively undertake social responsibilities,integrating corresponding performance assessment mechanisms with salary systems can lead to better incentive effects.

关 键 词：国有企业集团 薪酬制度改革 薪酬—级别倒挂 慈善捐赠 迎合动机 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F275.1[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92