高管垂直薪酬差距与企业违规——基于经济发展水平的调节效应  

Executive Vertical Pay Gap and Firm Irregularities——Moderating Effect Based on Economic Development Level

作　　者：吴婧 WU Jing(School of Economics and Management,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《商业观察》2023年第29期107-112,116,共7页BUSINESS OBSERVATION

摘　　要：以2010—2020年沪深A股上市企业为样本,从代理理论和锦标赛理论角度出发,实证检验高管垂直薪酬差距与企业违规行为之间的关系,研究发现:企业中高管薪酬差距过大,会产生负面激励效果,管理层出于自利和晋升动机,采取忽视风险的行为,让企业陷入违规风险之中,对信息披露类与经营类违规的影响显著,这种影响在国有企业中不甚明显。企业所在地区的经济发展水平能调节两者的关系,监管机构对落后地区上市公司的监管力度相对较弱,经济发展水平高的地区监管和处罚力度更强,可以抑制高管薪酬差距带来的企业违规倾向。Taking Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as samples,this paper empirically tests the relationship between executive vertical pay gap and firm irregularities from the perspective of agency theory and tournament theory.The findings are as follows:a large salary gap between senior executives in an enterprise will generate negative incentive effects,The management,motivated by self-interest and promotion,will ignore risks,and the enterprise will be caught in the risk of violation,which has a significant impact on information disclosure and management violations,which is not obvious in state-owned enterprises.The economic development level of the region where the enterprise is located regulates the relationship between the two.The supervision of the regulatory bodies on the listed companies in backward regions is relatively weak,and the supervision and punishment of the regions with high economic development level are stronger,so as to restrain the tendency of enterprises to violate the rules caused by the executive pay gap.

关 键 词：锦标赛理论 高管垂直薪酬差距 企业违规行为 经济发展水平 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]