人工智能体法律主体资格之争的商谈理论解决方案  

The Solution of the Debates on the Artificial Intelligence’s Capacity as Legal Subject by Discourse Theory

作　　者：高诗宇 GAO Shiyu

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《哲学分析》2023年第5期121-132,198,199,共14页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：随着人工智能技术不断发展,是否赋予人工智能体以法律主体资格成为了法学界和哲学界热议的前沿问题。目前这些讨论都诉诸把人工智能体与人进行比较,把人的主体资格作为判断人工智能体主体资格的标准,因而造成了争论不休的局面,无法彻底地解决问题。哈贝马斯的商谈理论能为我们摆脱这种争论的困境提供可能的新思路。从商谈理论基本立场出发,人工智能体的主体资格就应该从实体性地规定权利义务转向对其参与法律商谈的程序性条件的保障。这一新的理论视角具备三个优势:可以减轻论证人工智能体主体资格的理论负担,为解决当下热议的人工智能体权利问题提供参考,同时适应人工智能技术未来的发展趋势。With the constant development of artificial intelligence technology,whether artificial intelligencecan be endowed with legal subject has become a hot cutting-edge topic in jurisprudential and philosophical circle.The present discussions appeal to the comparison between artificial intelligence and human being,take human’s subject qualification as criteria to judge artificial intelligence’s legal subject and thus leads to the contentioussituation in which the problems cannot be completely resolved.Habermas’discourse theory provides new thought toget us rid of the debated dilemma.According to the basic stance of discourse theory,artificial intelligence’s subjectshould be transferred from substantively stipulating their rights and duties to securing their procedural rights to participate in legal discourse.This new theoretical perspective has three advantages:it can relieve the theoreticalburden to justify artificial intelligence’s subject,provide reference to resolve currently debated problem of artificial intelligence’s rights and meanwhile adapt to the future development of artificial intelligence technology.

关 键 词：商谈理论 主体资格 主体间性 程序主义 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]