核心竞争力能否提高高公司薪酬业绩敏感性?  

Can Core Competence Improve Pay-Performance Sensitivity?

作　　者：王化成[1] 林子昂 孙昌玲 WANG Hua-cheng;LIN Zi-ang;SUN Chang-ling

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院 [2]清华大学经济管理学院 [3]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2023年第5期3-14,共12页Finance Research

基　　金：中国人民大学重大规划项目(2021030218);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2022NTSS02)。

摘　　要：本文利用文本分析方法构建企业核心竞争力指标,以2007~2021年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了核心竞争力与薪酬契约有效性的关系及其潜在的作用机制。研究发现,核心竞争力的提高有助于增强薪酬业绩敏感性。其作用机制为:核心竞争力强的企业需要激励高管承担风险,而且核心竞争力建设有助于提高盈余质量与内部控制质量,可以有效监督管理者机会主义行为。进一步研究结果表明,核心竞争力对薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用在国有企业和高管权力较大的企业中更显著。本研究揭示了核心竞争力在薪酬契约设计中的重要作用,丰富了核心竞争力与公司财务交叉学科研究,拓展了薪酬契约影响因素的相关文献。This paper uses textual analysis method to construct corporate core competence proxy and empirically examines the relationship between core competence and the effectiveness of compensation contracts.Using A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research sample,this paper finds that core competence is positively associated with pay-performance sensitivity.The mechanism tests reveal that firms with strong core competence are more likely to adopt the high performance-sensitive compensation contract to stimulate managers to take risks.In addition,core competence helps firms to improve the earnings information quality and internal control systems.Further tests find that the positive effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises and firms supervised by powerful managers.This study highlights the important role of core competence in contract design,contributes to the interdisciplinary research of corporate strategy and corporate finance,and expands the literature on the determinants of compensation contracts.

关 键 词：核心竞争力 薪酬业绩敏感性 风险承担 盈余质量 内部控制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]