独立董事如何影响股权激励的效果  

How Independent Directors Influence the Effects of Equity-Based Incentives

作　　者：居靖淞 JU Jingsong(School of Accounting,Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics,Lanzhou 730030,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州财经大学会计学院,甘肃兰州730030

出　　处：《商业观察》2023年第32期84-87,共4页BUSINESS OBSERVATION

摘　　要：股权激励制度是一种有效的薪酬机制,它能够有效地解决经营权与所有权分离而带来的委托代理问题。目前,大部分国内学者将股权激励作为一个整体变量去考虑其对企业的影响,并对股权激励是否能够降低企业代理成本持有不同看法。文章拟加入独立董事这个变量,并将股权激励细分为行权条件、类型的选择以及高管在股权激励实施过程中的业绩操纵行为,探究独立董事与股权激励有效性两者间的关系。最后提出一些建议,以期对丰富股权激励的相关研究有所帮助。The equity-based incentive system is an effective salary mechanism,which can effectively solve the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of management right and ownership.At present,most domestic scholars consider equity-based incentives as an overall variable to consider the impact on enterprises,and hold different views on whether equity-based incentives can reduce the agency costs of enterprises.This paper intends to add the variable of independent directors,and subdivide equity-based incentives into vesting conditions,type selection and performance manipulation behaviors of executives in the implementation of equity-based incentives.The paper explores the relationship between independent directors and the effects of equity-based incentives.Finally,some suggestions are put forward in order to enrich the research on equity-based incentives.

关 键 词：股权激励 独立董事 股票期权 限制性股票 激励对象 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F832[经济管理—国民经济]