赔付促销机制下考虑双边努力水平的网络广告服务链协调  

The Coordination of Online Advertising Service Chain under the Compensation Promotion Mechanism Considering the Level of Bilateral Efforts

作　　者：张运环 葛泽慧[1,2] 王道平 胡华清[3] ZHANG Yun-huan;GE Ze-hui;WANG Dao-ping;HU Hua-qing(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China;The Institute of Low Carbon Operations Strategy for Beijing Enterprises,Beijing 100083 China;Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京企业低碳运营战略研究基地,北京100083 [3]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《系统工程》2023年第5期53-67,共15页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871016,71871017);北京市社会科学基金资助项目(18JDGLB033)。

摘　　要：随着网络广告行业竞争日益加剧,媒体纷纷采取赔付促销机制吸引广告主投放广告。本文针对由媒体和代理商组成的两级网络广告服务链,在双方努力水平和赔付促销机制共同驱动需求的背景下,基于成本分担方式的不同构建了三种决策模型,研究了不同成本分担机制对服务链协调的有效性,并通过扩展模型对基本模型的稳健性进行了检验。结果表明:代理商分担媒体赔付成本虽然可以迫使其提高服务努力水平,但媒体同时降低了运营努力水平,导致代理商最终的利润低于分散决策情形。媒体分担代理商服务努力成本能够有效激励代理商提高服务努力水平,同时增加自身利润。双边努力成本和赔付成本共担契约,在一定条件下能够同时协调双方努力水平,并实现渠道成员利润的帕累托改进。此外,媒体和代理商合作进行成本分担可以通过“马太效应”的积极影响提高服务链竞争力,强化赔付力度增大对利润的正向影响,弱化赔付力度增大对利润的负向影响。With the increasing fierce competition in online advertising industry,many media have started adopting compensation promotion mechanism to attract advertisers.This paper investigates a two-echelon online advertising service chain consisting of a media and an agent.Considering that bilateral effort level and compensation promotion mechanism contribute to the advertising demand,we establish three models based on different cost sharing decisions to examine their effectiveness in service chain coordination,namely,the agent shares media's compensation cost(contract CS),the media shares agent's service effort cost(contract ES),bilateral effort cost and compensation cost sharing(contract BS).We have found that although contract CS can force the agent to improve service effort level,media reduce its operation effort level at the same time,which makes the agent get lower profit compared to the decentralized model.Contract ES can effectively motivate the agent to improve effort level and benefit the media.Contract BS can coordinate the effort level of both parties under certain conditions,and realize Pareto improvement of channel members'profit.In addition,cooperative cost sharing between media and agent can improve the competitiveness of the service supply chain through the positive effects of the Matthew Effect,strengthen the positive impact of compensation intensity on profits,and weaken the negative impacts of compensation intensity on profits.Finally,we also demonstrate the robustness of our findings under an alternative model specification.

关 键 词：服务链协调 网络广告 努力成本 赔付成本 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]