休谟的人格同一性之谜  

Hume's Labyrinth of Personal Identity

作　　者：车家昊 CHE Jiahao(School of Philosophy,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan,Hubei 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《肇庆学院学报》2023年第6期13-16,共4页Journal of Zhaoqing University

摘　　要：休谟在《人性论》附录中承认,当他运用自己的知觉理论去探讨人格同一性问题时,得出的结论是很有缺陷的。具体来说,有两条原则之间存在不一致,但休谟并没有直接陈述原则的不一致之处。很多哲学家先后提出了自己对这个问题的理解,然而这些理解都没有抓住休谟的两条原则的冲突之处。通过考量一些解释的共同缺陷,我们发现休谟人格同一性解释的关键问题在于他过于狭隘的本体论预设。Hume admitted in the appendix ofA Treatise of Human Nature that when he used his theory of perception to solve the problem of personality identity,the conclusion he reached was very flawed.Specifically,there are inconsistencies between the two principles,but Hume did not directly state the inconsistencies of the principles.Many philosophers have proposed their own understanding of this issue,but these understandings have not grasped the conflict between Hume's two principles.By considering the common defects of some interpretations,we find that the key problem of Hume's interpretation of personal identity lies in his narrow ontological presupposition.

关 键 词：休谟 人格同一性 本体论预设 

分 类 号：B504[哲学宗教—外国哲学]