论哈奇森对以霍布斯为首的道德利己主义的批判——从“passion”和“affection”谈起  

On Hutchison's Critique of Moral Egoism Led by Hobbes——Starting from"Passion"and"Affection"

作　　者：李薇[1] LI Wei(Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院哲学研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2023年第6期18-26,共9页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

摘　　要：为了批判以霍布斯为首的道德利己主义,有效处理利己和利他、个人利益和国家利益之间的关系,哈奇森通过系统建构一种道德感理论来树立普遍仁爱观。他首先对情感的基础术语passion和affection进行重新考察,用普遍仁爱定义道德善,之后又竭力将与利己相关的一切与道德划清界限以确保仁爱的纯粹性。然而,哈奇森道德学说中存在无法融贯的两条路径:经验主义和神学,这导致其批判方案存在诸多矛盾和局限性。因此,系统分析并客观评价哈奇森的批判工作,不仅有助于我们深入了解其仁爱观和道德感理论,还能从中洞察随后的情感主义者对利己和利他、个人利益和国家利益之间关系的持续调和与深刻反思。In order to criticize the moral egoism led by Hobbes and effectively handle the relationship between self-interest and altruism,as well as personal interests and national interests,Hutcheson establishes a view of universal benevolence by systematically constructing a moral sense theory.He first reexamined the fundamental terms of emotion,passion and affection,defining moral goodness with universal benevolence,and then made every effort to draw a clear line between everything related to self-interest and morality to ensure the purity of benevolence.However,there are two paths in Hutcheson's moral theory that cannot be integrated:empiricism and theology,which leads to many contradictions and limitations in his critical plan.Therefore,a systematic analysis and objective evaluation of Hutcheson's critical work not only helps us gain a deeper understanding of his views on benevolence and moral sense theory,but also provides insights into the subsequent sentimentalists'continuous reconciliation and profound reflection on the relationship between self-interest and altruism,personal interests and national interests.

关 键 词：道德利己主义 PASSION AFFECTION 道德感 仁爱 

分 类 号：B561.2[哲学宗教—外国哲学]