管理层权力下沉与高管薪酬激励效率损失  

Managerial Power Delegation and Efficiency Loss of Executive Compensation Incentives

作　　者：徐嘉倩 史珂 徐莉萍[1] 辛宇[1] XU Jia-qian;SHI Ke;XU Li-ping;XIN Yu(Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275;E Fund Management Co.,Ltd,Guangzhou 510620,China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [2]易方达基金管理有限公司,广东广州510620

出　　处：《当代财经》2024年第1期86-99,共14页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金面上项目“公司章程自治视角下的管理层权力下沉:现状与经济后果”(2023A1515010802);国家自然科学基金重点项目“国有资本并购重组理论、机制与模式研究”(72132010)。

摘　　要：基于手工收集整理的2010—2019年上市公司章程修改公告中管理层权力变更的数据,采用双重差分方法检验基于公司章程自治的管理层权力下沉对高管薪酬影响的研究表明,管理层权力下沉后,高管薪酬和超额薪酬均显著增加。具体而言,管理层权力下沉后,高管薪酬和超额薪酬的增加主要体现为规模薪酬(而非业绩薪酬)的明显增加,同时企业的薪酬业绩敏感性明显下降。这些经验证据支持了管理层权力理论。管理层权力下沉后,公司的在职消费增加、内部和外部薪酬差距均加大,但公司未来的经营绩效和市场价值并未显著提升。因此,基于公司章程自治的管理层权力下沉可能引起高管薪酬激励的效率损失。公司内外部监督机制和管理层持股都对管理层权力下沉与高管薪酬的正相关关系具有抑制作用。基于上述研究结论,公司在修改章程向管理层授权的同时,应重视可能存在的高管寻租行为,做到恰当授权和有效监管。Based on the manually collected and organized data on the changes in management power in the amendment announcements of the charters of listed companies from 2010 to 2019,this paper adopts a double difference method to test the impact of management power sinking based on the autonomy of the company's charter on the executive compensation.The findings show that after the management power sinking,both the executive compensation and the excess compensation are sig-nificantly increased.Specifically,when the management power sinks,the increase in executive com-pensation and excess compensation is mainly reflected in a significant increase in scale compensation(rather than performance-based compensation),while the sensitivity of the company's compensation performance significantly decreases.These empirical evidences support the management power theory.When the management power sinks,the company's on-the-job consumption increases and the internal and external salary gap widens,but the company's future business performance and market value have not significantly improved.Therefore,the decentralization of management power according to the au-tonomy of the company's charter may lead to efficiency losses in the executive compensation incen-tives.The internal and external supervision mechanisms of the company,as well as the shareholding of the management,have a restraining effect on the positive correlation between the sinking of the management power and the executive compensation.Based on the above research conclusions,when companies modify their charters to authorize the management,they should pay attention to the poten-tial rent-seeking behaviors of the executives,and achieve appropriate authorization and effective super-vision.

关 键 词：章程自治 管理层权力下沉 高管薪酬 超额薪酬 效率损失 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]