民营企业“反向混改”的治理效应发挥几何?——基于监管问询的证据  

How about the governance effect of“reverse mixed ownership reform”in private enterprises-evidence based on regulatory inquiry

作　　者：黄阳 陈培培 游夏蕾 窦军生[4] HUANG Yang;CHEN Peipei;YOU Xialei;DOU Junsheng(School of Business,Jinling Institute of Technology,Nanjing 211169,China;School of Management,Wenzhou Business College,Wenzhou 325035,China;School of Management,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou 310014,China;School of Management,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)

机构地区：[1]金陵科技学院商学院,江苏南京211169 [2]温州商学院管理学院,浙江温州325035 [3]浙江工业大学管理学院,浙江杭州310014 [4]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第1期162-178,共17页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL112);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102213);金陵科技学院高层次人才科研启动项目(jit-b-202316)。

摘　　要：国有资本参股民营企业的“反向混改”路径是新一轮混合所有制改革的重要抓手。与已有研究大多关注国有资本的“资源效应”不同,本文基于监管问询制度情境,分析并检验国有资本参股给民营企业带来的“治理效应”这一重要但却被严重忽视的问题。以2015—2019沪深A股民营上市企业为样本,本文实证检验了国有资本参股民营企业对问询函接收概率的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:国有资本参股比例越高,民营企业被问询的概率越大,在经过多重稳健性检验后这一结论仍然成立。分组回归结果显示,在制度环境好、无参政高管和家族制民营企业三种情境中,上述效应能够得到缓解。进一步探索这一效应的内在机制发现,现阶段国有资本入股民营企业后,在公司治理方面更有可能带来行政干预效应,不仅会削弱企业内部控制水平,还可能降低会计信息质量,进而增加企业被监管问询的可能性。本研究基于中国制度背景拓展了公司治理理论的研究边界,同时为政府和企业进一步分层分类深化混合所有制改革提供经验依据和政策参考。In November 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee identified developing a mixed ownership economy as a national strategy.Since then,extensive discussions have been conducted in the practical and academic circles on the path and economic consequences of mixed ownership reform.However,the extant research mainly focus on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,Regarding the participation of state-owned capital in the“reverse mix”of private enterprises,little is known.Moreover,the few existing studies have been limited to discussing the“resource effect”that state capital brings to private enterprises,while the“governance effect”it may bring to private enterprises has been largely ignored.To fill this research void,the purpose of this paper is to investigate the governance effect and potential mechanisms in the“reverse mix”of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises in the context of the regulatory inquiry system.First,we drew insights from the resource effect,reputation effect,and administrative intervention effect literature of state capital participation and proposed two competing hypotheses that capture the positive and negative sides of state capital participation on the inquiry probability of private firms.Taking A-share private enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2019 as a sample,we manually collected information on private companies receiving inquiry letters from the official website of the exchange and extracted relevant financial and corporate governance data from the Guotaian database.Using a logit model for multiple regression analysis,we found that the higher the proportion of state-owned capital,the higher the probability of private enterprises receiving inquiry letters.This empirical result supports the administrative intervention effect hypothesis,indicating that the governance function of state-owned equity is not effectively exercised.Second,we conducted a series of subgroup analyses.After distinguishing between di

关 键 词：民营企业 混合所有制改革 治理效应 监管问询 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]