资产误定价与高管薪酬业绩敏感性  

Mispricing of Asset and Managers′Pay-Performance Sensitivity

作　　者：谢乔昕 葛晶尔 XIE Qiao-xin;GE Jing-er(School of Accounting,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2024年第1期33-45,共13页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划“党的二十大和省委十五届二次全会精神研究阐释”专项课题“逆境事件冲击下数字化赋能制造企业创新韧性的效应、机制及提升策略研究”(项目编号:37);浙江省高校重大人文社科攻关课题青年重点项目“‘双碳’目标下制造企业绿色转型与生存风险的冲突困境及纾解政策研究”(项目编号:2023QN081)。

摘　　要：以2010—2020年的沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验资产误定价对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,资产误定价显著抑制了高管薪酬业绩敏感性。机制分析发现,代理成本提升和信息透明度上升是资产误定价影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性的主要作用渠道。进一步分析发现,管理层权力显著强化了股价低估对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的抑制作用。相较于其他企业,股价高估对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的抑制作用在国有企业、内部控制质量较高的企业中表现得更明显。研究结论丰富了资产误定价对公司行为影响的研究,同时为完善高管薪酬激励与契约设计提供决策参考。Using the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2020,this paper empirically tests the impact of asset mispricing on the managers′pay-performance sensitivity.we find that asset mispricing significantly inhibits the managers′pay-performance sensitivity.The mechanism analysis shows that agency costs and information opacity are the main influencial channels for asset mispricing infulcing the managers′pay-performance sensitivity.Further analysis shows that,management power significantly strengthens the inhibitory effect of stock price undervaluation on the managers′pay-performance sensitivity.Compared with other enterprises,the inhibitory effect of stock price overvaluation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with higher internal control quality.The results enrich the research on the impact of asset mispricing on corporate behavior,and provide decision-making reference for improving executive compensation incentives and contract design.

关 键 词：资产误定价 薪酬业绩敏感性 代理成本 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]