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作 者:王长琼[1] 田仁久 WANG Changqiong;TIAN Renjiu(School of Transportation and Logistics Engineering,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430063,China)
机构地区:[1]武汉理工大学交通与物流工程学院,武汉430063
出 处:《武汉理工大学学报(交通科学与工程版)》2024年第1期196-204,共9页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology(Transportation Science & Engineering)
摘 要:文中运用博弈论求得了集中决策和分散决策下双渠道供应链最优定价决策和单位碳减排决策,分析了碳交易价格、消费者渠道偏好和低碳偏好对最优决策的影响,采用了收益共享-成本分担契约协调供应链,并通过数值算例验证了模型和结论的有效性.结果表明:在一定的条件下,两种渠道的定价均随碳交易价格的增加而降低;线上直销渠道价格与线上渠道偏好成正相关,线下零售渠道价格则相反;合理的碳交易价格、渠道偏好和低碳偏好有助于碳减排和供应链整体利润的提高;集中决策下单位产品碳减排量和供应链整体利润均高于分散决策时;收益共享-成本分担契约能使供应链成员的利润实现Pareto改进.The optimal pricing decision and unit carbon reduction decision of dual-channel supply chain under centralized decision and decentralized decision were obtained by using game theory,and the influence of carbon transaction price,consumer channel preference and low carbon preference on the optimal decision was analyzed.The revenue sharing-cost sharing contract was adopted to coordinate the supply chain.Finally,a numerical example was given to verify the effectiveness of the model and conclusion.The results show that under certain conditions,the pricing of both channels decreases with the increase of carbon trading price.The online direct channel price is positively correlated with online channel preference,while the offline retail channel price is the opposite.Reasonable carbon trading price,channel preference and low carbon preference are helpful to carbon emission reduction and the overall profit of supply chain.The carbon emission reduction per unit product and the overall profit of supply chain under centralized decision-making are higher than those under decentralized decision-making Revenue sharing-cost sharing contract can improve the profits of supply chain members Pareto.
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