需求信息不对称下军民两用国防专利的许可定价策略  

Research on Licensing Pricing Strategy of Dual-use DefensePatent under the Asymmetric Demand Information

作　　者：闫飞 陈洪转[1] YAN Fei;CHEN Hongzhuan(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第1期16-22,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BJY094)。

摘　　要：在军民市场需求信息不对称条件下,本文将市场需求划分为大众市场和机会市场两种类型,以军方科研院所向其持股民用制造商许可两用国防专利为背景,首先,分别构建持股、持股-提成、持股-提成-固定费用三种许可模式下的信息甄别博弈模型;其次,分析不同许可模式下军方对大众市场或机会市场的选择策略及其最优解;最后,对比三种不同许可模式,并找出最优定价策略。研究发现,在市场需求信息不对称条件下,军方科研院所可以通过对许可定价策略进行设计,以最大程度区分大众市场和机会市场;持股-提成许可模式中的提成策略可以在一定程度上阻止民用制造商逆向选择,且减小了国防专利许可交易失败的概率;持股-提成许可优于持股-提成-固定费用许可模式。The transfer of dual-use defense patents from military to civilian fields has been increasingly regarded as the key path to deep integration of both military and civilian fields.In the context of the rapid development of high-tech technologies and products,it is even harder to predict the demand market.Based on the sensitivity difference of market demand information between military and civilian fields,the asymmetry of information between the two sides has arisen.Only by adopting different license methods for different demand markets can military research institutions distinguish between different types of demand markets,avoid false reporting of demand information by civilian manufacturers,and ensure sustainable and reasonable income.This can also enhance the source of motivation for military research institutions to transfer dual-use defense patents,and promote the virtuous cycle of the entire dual-use defense patent license industry.Under the background of asymmetric demand information between military defense patent owners and civilian manufacturers,the military research institutes license the declassified defense patents to civilian manufacturers.In the mass market and opportunity market,the military licenses the national defense patents to the civilian manufacturer with three licensing modes:equity participation,equity-royalty and equity-royalty-fixed fee,respectively.Three kinds of licensing pricing strategy information screening game models are constructed,and the influence of these three licensing pricing strategies on the military research institute and civilian manufacturer is compared and analyzed.Besides,we also analyze the impact of each licensing pricing strategy choice on both the military research institutes and civilian manufacturers.It is found that under the condition of asymmetric demand information,the technology licensing pricing method of equity will only lead to the civilian manufacturer’misrepresentation about the market demand information,and the military research institute will suffer

关 键 词：需求信息不对称 军民两用国防专利 许可定价 持股 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]