混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Cooperative Behavior of Top-management Teams in Mixed Ownership Enterprises

作　　者：宋美 王振源[1] 葛玉辉[2] 刘举胜 SONG Mei;WANG Zhenyuan;GE Yuhui;LIU Jusheng(School of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200062,China;Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;School of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201701,China)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学经济与管理学院,上海200062 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [3]上海政法学院经济管理学院,上海201701

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2024年第1期85-91,共7页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72072057);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(17YJA630020);上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK);上海政法学院青年教师国家社科基金培育项目(C-02-22-009-0401)。

摘　　要：基于有限理性视角,运用演化博弈理论,构建了国企高管团队和私企高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈模型,探讨了违约罚金、政府奖励、合作成本、合作收益对高管团队合作行为演化的影响,并对其演化过程进行了数值仿真和相关分析。研究表明:混合所有制企业高管团队合作双方的最终策略将会稳定于合作与不合作策略,不会稳定于一方合作,一方不合作策略。其中,在一定范围内,增大违约罚金,增加政府奖励,减小合作成本,增大合作收益系数将会促使国企高管和私企高管合作行为由不合作向合作进行转变。研究以期为中国国企混改顺利推进,形成国企混改高效制度安排提供一定参鉴意义。Based on the perspective of bounded rationality,this paper first constructed a dynamic game model of dynamic cooperative behavior to explore this problem.Secondly,it discussed the impact of contract fines,government incentives,cooperation costs,and cooperation revenues on the evolution of top-management team behavior.Finally,it carried out numerical simulation and correlation analysis on its evolution process.The research shows that the final strategy of the two sides in the cooperation of the senior management team of mixed ownership enterprises will be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy,and will not be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy of one party.Among them,within a certain range,increasing the penalty of contract,increasing government incentives,reducing cooperation costs,and increasing the coefficient of cooperation revenue can promote the transformation from non-cooperation to cooperation.We hope that this study can provide some reference significance for the smooth progress of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and form efficient institutional arrangements.

关 键 词：混合所有制企业 高管团队 合作行为 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]