姻亲涉入下的家族企业冒险性决策:研发投入还是盈余操纵?  

The Impact of In-laws’Involvement on Risk-taking Decisions in Family Firms:R&D Investment or Earnings Manipulation?

作　　者：贺小刚 戚阳阳 舒心 He Xiaogang;Qi Yangyang;Shu Xin(College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;The Department of Business Administration,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhejiang College,Jinhua 321000,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学商学院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学浙江学院工商管理系,浙江金华321000

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2024年第3期69-87,共19页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672105,71972121,72272096);国家自然科学基金重点国际(地区)合作研究项目(71810107002);国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL088)。

摘　　要：本文基于家族代理理论,以研发投入和盈余操纵为切入点,探究姻亲涉入管理对家族企业冒险性决策的影响。文章以中国家族上市公司的数据进行实证检验,结果表明,姻亲担任公司高管会导致家族企业的研发投入动力显著降低,而盈余操纵动机则显著增强;改变姻亲成员的家族代理人身份,允许其持有公司股份既可以强化姻亲管理者的研发投入动力,又能弱化其盈余操纵动机。进一步的分析表明,涉入管理的不同姻亲结构在研发投入决策上持有一致的谨慎态度,但对于短期导向的投机决策存在差异化的风险偏好,体现为近姻亲涉入管理的盈余操纵动机更强;后代参与治理将弱化姻亲消极对待公司研发的动机,但会助长姻亲的盈余操纵;期望落差状态则不仅弱化姻亲消极对待研发的动机,而且能够显著遏制姻亲的盈余操纵动机。本文从家族成员组合异质性的视角深入分析家族系统在公司治理中的作用机制,为家族治理研究打开了新的思路,也为促进姻亲有效参与企业决策提供了实践启示。The antecedents of family firms’risk-taking decisions have been the focus of scholarship for a long time.With more and more family members getting involved in business activities,there are different kinship combinations within family firms,which gradually become one important factor that affects family firms’decision-making processes.In-laws’involvement can solve some difficulties,such as the scarcity of family venture capital,labor force,and social capital,which is conducive to developing family firms.But it may also increase the probability of family conflicts,which negatively affects family business.However,the question of how in-laws’involvement affects the risktaking decisions of family firms is still lacking of attention.Using the data set of China’s listed family firms from 2008 to 2016,this paper explores the impact of in-laws’involvement on family firms’risktaking decisions from the perspective of R&D investment and earnings manipulation.The results show that in-laws taking the role of executives will significantly reduce the R&D investment motivation of family firms,while the earnings manipulation incentive will increase.Transforming in-law executives’roles of family agents by giving them shares can strengthen their R&D investment motivation and weaken their earnings manipulation incentive.Further analysis shows that different in-law relationships involved in management keep the same cautious attitude towards R&D investment.But they have different risk preferences for short-term oriented speculative decisions,which shows that close in-laws are more motivated to manipulate earnings.Besides,the involvement of the second generation in governance can increase both in-laws’R&D investment and earnings manipulation motivations.The negative performance feedback of firms can significantly increase in-laws’R&D investment motivation,but alleviate their earnings manipulation motivation.This paper offers several contributions:First,it takes in-laws’involvement as the breakthrough point and exam

关 键 词：姻亲涉入 家族企业 家族代理理论 研发投入 盈余操纵 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]