契约制度、生产复杂性与工业机器人兴起——基于内部化优势视角  

Contract Institution,Production Complexity and the Rise of Industrial Robots:From the Perspective of Internalization Advantage

作　　者：蒋为[1] 李锡涛 龚思豪 JIANG Wei;LI Xi-tao;GONG Si-hao(School of International Business,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学国际商学院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2024年第3期138-156,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“地区间产业政策竞争、市场分割与资源空间误置”(批准号71973108);四川省自然科学青年基金项目“产学融合与中国企业创新:基于公共科研机构技术转让视角的理论与实证研究”(批准号2023NSFSC1061);西南财经大学“光华英才工程”及2023年度西南财经大学“中央高校基本科研业务费”研究生科研项目的资助。

摘　　要：机器人在全球范围内的兴起是第四次科技革命以来工业自动化发展的重要特征,本文从契约制度层面为解析其兴起提供了新的理论视角。本文通过将企业与劳动力的不完全契约关系和机器人的所有权关系引入企业任务生产方程之中,从内部化优势视角构建契约制度与工业机器人兴起模式之间的理论联系,基于1993-2019年跨国多维面板数据,采用广义双重差分模型,检验了国家契约制度和行业生产复杂性对全球工业机器人兴起的影响。研究发现,契约制度质量较低的国家在生产复杂性更高的行业会采用更多工业机器人,契约制度是塑造全球工业机器人兴起的重要驱动因素。企业凭借对工业机器人的内部管理和控制活动,能够有效降低契约不完全带来的交易成本,通过所有权关系获得占有和使用工业机器人生产的内部化优势,从而导致各行业自动化发展的差异。本文为一国合理协调工业自动化发展和劳动者就业、实现工业自动化与就业优先双重目标提供了有益的政策启示。The rise of robots worldwide is an important feature of industrial automation.While existing studies have investigated the driving forces behind the phenomenon in terms of technological advancements and labor costs,few have analyzed it from the perspective of contract institutions within the framework of incomplete contracts.Enterprise theory posits that firms are amalgamations of contracts,with the labor contract being fundamental.However,labor contracts frequently remain incomplete.This incompleteness is especially pronounced in countries with poor contract enforcement,leading to heightened transaction costs for firms due to the absence of enforcement constraints.In contrast to contractual relationships,firms assume ownership of industrial robots.By engaging in internal management and control of these robots,firms can significantly mitigate transaction costs caused by incomplete labor contracts and realize the internalization advantage of production processes.This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the behavioral rationale behind firms'decisions regarding robot adoption from the perspective of contract institutions and provides valuable policy insights for countries seeking to rationally reconcile robot adoption and employment.This paper incorporates incomplete labor contracts and the ownership relationship of robots into a complementary task production model,establishing a theoretical framework to assess the impact of contract institution and industry production complexity on robot adoption.Subsequently,utilizing crosscountry panel data from 1993 to 2019,the paper empirically tests the theoretical prediction through a generalized difference-in-differences(DID)model and conducts robustness tests.Lastly,the paper examines and excludes other potentially competing hypotheses concerning country-specific environments and industry production characteristics.The findings indicate that in countries with lowquality contract institutions,industries with high production complexity increase their investment in rob

关 键 词：契约不完全 契约制度 内部化优势 工业机器人 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]