检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:雷源浩 Yuanhao Lei(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi Jiangsu)
机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡
出 处:《运筹与模糊学》2024年第2期652-661,共10页Operations Research and Fuzziology
摘 要:能否调动复杂装备协同研制主体的积极性与能动性,设计恰当的激励机制,诱导其投入更多的努力程度,是复杂装备协同研制管理迫切需要解决的问题。鉴于此,考虑到努力程度是复杂装备协同研制的重要参数,基于博弈分析技术,本文构建了利润分配模型,并利用其分析主制造商与供应商非合作和合作情形下复杂装备协同研制主体最优决策,进而从增值利润共享角度,设计激励机制。结果表明,所设计的机制能够调动供应商积极性,实现研制主体和研制系统利润增加与长期稳定合作。Mobilizing the enthusiasm and initiative of the collaborative development main body of complex equipment,and designing the appropriate incentive mechanism to induce them to input more effort degree has become an urgent problem to be solved.In view of this,considering that the effort degree is an important parameter in the collaborative development of complex equipment,based on game analysis technology,we establish a profit distribution model,and exploit to solve the optimal decision and profits of the main body of under non cooperation and cooperation between the main manufacturer and the suppliers,and then design the incentive mechanism of the main manufacturer and supplier based on value-added profit sharing.The results show that the designed mechanism can mobilize the enthusiasm of suppliers,and realize the increasing of the profit of each body and development system and long-term stable cooperation.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:18.188.80.46