信息不对称下二手电商平台三方动态博弈分析——基于贝叶斯模型  

Tripartite Dynamic Game Analysis of Second-Hand E-Commerce Platform under Information Asymmetry--Based on Bayesian Model

作　　者：章亚彬 王小芳[1] Yabin Zhang;Xiaofang Wang(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2024年第2期714-727,共14页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：随着我国二手电商市场的快速发展,如何构建买卖双方与二手电商平台的监管机制促进二手电商行业健康发展,是亟待解决的问题。本文基于贝叶斯模型刻画信息不对称下的二手商品买卖双方与电商平台的动态博弈过程,通过求解均衡策略分析影响各方策略选择的因素。结果表明:平台加强检查、加大对劣质二手商品卖家的惩罚力度,减少消费者购买二手商品的成本,降低卖家提供低质量二手商品的收益等措施均有利于提高二手商品的质量。With the rapid development of China’s second-hand e-commerce market,how to establish a regulatory mechanism between buyers and sellers and second-hand e-commerce platforms to promote the healthy development of the second-hand e-commerce industry is an urgent problem that needs to be solved. This article is based on a Bayesian model to depict the dynamic game process between buyers and sellers of second-hand goods and e-commerce platforms under information asymmetry. By solving equilibrium strategies, it analyzes the factors that affect the strategychoices of all parties. The results show that measures such as strengthening inspections on platforms, increasing punishment for sellers of low-quality second-hand goods, reducing the cost of purchasing second-hand goods for consumers, and reducing the revenue from sellers providing low-quality second-hand goods are all beneficial for improving the quality of second-hand goods.

关 键 词：信息不对称 二手电商平台 贝叶斯模型 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]