尊严能为生命伦理学奠基吗?——兼评程新宇《人的尊严与生命伦理》  

Can Dignity Lay the Foundation for Bioethics?:A Review of CHENG Xinyu's Human Dignity and Bioethics

作　　者：陈江进[1] CHEN Jiangjin(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《医学与哲学》2024年第13期78-80,F0003,共4页Medicine and Philosophy

摘　　要：针对尊严能否作为生命伦理学的基础的问题,有些学者基于尊严的相对性、可压倒性与可还原性,声称尊严是一个无用的概念,因此不能为生命伦理学奠基。实际上,概念的相对性并不能成为可将其视为无用的根据。尊严绝非无用的概念,恰恰相反,尊严成为生命伦理学基础具有不可逃避性。当然,承认了尊严的有用性也并不等于主张尊严是不可压倒、不可替代、至高无上的。换言之,尊严作为生命伦理学的基础具有非唯一性,它与其他价值一起在生命伦理学的相关讨论中发挥重要作用。In response to the question of whether dignity can be served as a foundation for bioethics,some scholars claim that dignity is a useless concept based on its relativity,overridingness and reducibility and therefore cannot lay the foundation for bioethics.In fact,the relativity of concepts cannot justify its useless.Dignity is by no means a useless concept.On the contrary,dignity becomes indispensable as the foundation of bioethics.Of course,acknowledging the usefulness of dignity does not necessarily mean advocating that dignity is invincible,irreplaceable,and supreme.In other words,dignity is one of the useful foundational concepts of bioethics,along with other values,it plays an important role in the relevant discussions of bioethics.

关 键 词：尊严 生命伦理 权利 自主性 

分 类 号：R-05[医药卫生]