基于三方演化博弈的电商平台主导的供应链金融奖惩机制的研究  

Research on the Reward and Punishment Mechanism of E-Commerce Platform-Led Supply Chain Finance Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game

作　　者：唐博然 台玉红[1] Boran Tang;Yuhong Tai(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2024年第3期1364-1371,共8页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：在新时代背景下,电商企业以其推动线上线下融合、带动就业增长、促进产业升级、提高流通效率和增强市场活力等独特优势,为我国经济高质量发展注入新动能。与此同时,供应链金融作为一种创新金融模式,利用电商平台作为信息枢纽,将银行与企业紧密连接,运用先进技术优化资金流动,有望为小微企业提供可持续融资支持。本文针对电商主导的供应链金融模式,构建了“小微企业–商业银行–电商平台”三方的演化博弈模型,分析了各方的均衡策略及其稳定性条件。研究发现,当电商平台基准收益低于审核企业经营数据的成本、对企业数据真实性的奖惩力度高于企业造假获利时,各方“诚实合作”将成为稳定的均衡解,形成利益共赢的良性循环。In the context of the new era,e-commerce enterprises have injected new kinetic energy into the high-quality development of China’s economy with their unique advantages of promoting the integration of online and offline,driving employment growth,promoting industrial upgrading,improving circulation efficiency and enhancing market vitality.Meanwhile,supply chain finance,as an innovative financial model,utilizes e-commerce platform as an information hub,closely connects banks and enterprises,optimizes the flow of funds by using advanced technology,and is expected to provide sustainable financing support for small and micro enterprises.This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of“micro and small enterprises-commercial banks-e-commerce platform”for the e-commerce-led supply chain finance model,and analyzes the equilibrium strategies of each party and its stability conditions.It is found that when the benchmark revenue of e-commerce platforms is lower than the cost of auditing business data,and the reward and punishment for the authenticity of business data is higher than the profit of enterprises’counterfeiting,the“honest cooperation”of all parties will become a stable equilibrium solution,and form a virtuous circle of win-win benefits.

关 键 词：小微企业 商业银行 电商平台 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]