CEO任期、薪酬激励与企业双元创新  

CEO Tenure,Compensation Incentive and Corporate Ambidextrous Innovation

作　　者：马有才[1] 董力 MA Youcai;DONG Li(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2024年第4期391-399,共9页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目“产业集群升级与可持续创新型城市建设互动机理与政策研究”(17YJA790065)。

摘　　要：双元创新是企业可持续发展的重要途径,CEO任期对企业双元创新会产生何种影响尚未得到统一结论。以我国2017—2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用固定效应模型探究CEO任期与企业双元创新之间的关系。研究结果显示:CEO任期对探索式创新产生负向影响,对开发式创新产生正向影响;薪酬激励在CEO任期与开发式创新之间起到显著正向调节作用,在CEO任期与探索式创新之间的正向调节作用不显著;CEO任期通过降低企业风险承担水平抑制探索式创新,通过缓解融资约束促进企业开发式创新;CEO任期与双元创新之间的关系在国有企业中更为明显。这些研究结论在丰富双元创新领域文献的同时,对企业科学完善CEO聘任制度和激励制度具有一定的启示意义。Ambidextrous innovation is an important approach to sustainable development of enterprises,the impact of CEO tenure on enterprise ambidextrous innovation has not yet reached a unified conclusion.Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2022 as samples,the paper uses the fixed effect model to explore the relationship between CEO tenure and enterprise ambidextrous innovation.The results show that CEO tenure has a negative impact on exploratory innovation,and a positive impact on exploitative innovation;that compensation incentive plays a significant positive role in the regulation of CEO tenure and exploitative innovation,but the positive regulation of CEO tenure and exploratory innovation is not significant;that CEO tenure inhibits exploratory innovation by reducing the level of enterprise risk taking,and promotes exploitative innovation by alleviating financing constraints;and that the relationship between CEO tenure and ambidextrous innovation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.These conclusions not only enrich the literature in the field of ambidextrous innovation,but also have certain enlightening significance for enterprises to scientifically improve the CEO appointment system and incentive system.

关 键 词：双元创新 CEO任期 薪酬激励 风险承担 融资约束 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]