全面禁止抑或严格限制:我国竞业限制制度的模式选择与规范进路  

Ban or Strict Regulation:China’s Non-Compete Mode and Normative Approaches

作　　者：陆海娜[1] 欧旭鸸 LU Hai-na;OU Xu-er(School of Law,Renmin University of China,Beijing,100086,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院,北京100086

出　　处：《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第4期62-69,共8页Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences

基　　金：北京市习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想研究中心项目“中国人权发展道路的历史文化底蕴、本质内涵与时代使命研究”(23LLFXA055)。

摘　　要：竞业限制涉及用人单位的商业秘密权与劳动者的就业权,并对公共利益产生影响,相关制度设计及其司法适用应当平衡好各方权益。立法的不完善和司法审查的宽松标准助长了用人单位滥用竞业限制。在大力发展新质生产力的背景下,虽然我国不能移植美国最新的“全面禁止”规则,但可以借鉴美国审理竞业限制可执行性的司法经验,在竞业限制领域建立起较为严格的二重审查基准,并配套以预防“事实竞业限制”的相关措施。Non-compete agreements involve the employer’s right to protect trade secrets and the employee’s right to work,and they also impact public interests.The design of relevant systems and their judicial application should balance the interests of all parties.In practice,the inadequacy of legislation and the lenient judicial standards in China have encouraged employers to misuse non-compete agreements.In the context of vigorously developing new productive forces,although China cannot transplant the latest“final rules”from the United States,it can learn from the judicial experience of America in reviewing the enforceability of non-compete agreements.China should establish relatively strict dual review standards in the field of non-compete agreements and support them with measures to prevent“de facto non-competition.”

关 键 词：劳动合同法 竞业限制 商业秘密 权益平衡 

分 类 号：DF472[政治法律—民商法学]