儒家“乡愿”批判的再审视——兼以康德“道德哲学”为视角的探讨  

Rethinking the Criticism of Confucian“Xiangyuan”-Exploration from the Perspective of Immanuel Kant’s“Moral Philosophy”

作　　者：姚凯文 张其成 Yao Kaiwen;Zhang Qicheng(Advanced Institute for Confucian Studies,Shandong University,Jinan,China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学儒学高等研究院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《社会科学论坛》2024年第5期47-57,共11页Tribune of Social Sciences

摘　　要：通过对传统儒家“乡愿”内涵与外延的深入剖析,可以发现儒家无法由外而内地判断“他者”乡愿之“实”,且在儒家家本位视角下,“愿”者之种种表现往往被冠以孝悌之名,但扩大到“乡”之范围却变成了众矢之的,这其中所折射的是儒家的道德哲学问题。从康德的“自由意志”与“定言命令”观照,可以发现其对于乡愿的判断是由“自我”出发的,而如果乡愿不能推广到普遍的“乡”中,那么不能也不应该在“家”的小范围中践行。此外,康德的道德哲学洞见了“根本恶”的存在,并为“第三种”乡愿提供了存在论的辩护,而儒家则显然缺少对“本心”“本性”自明性问题的反思。Through an in-depth analysis of the connotation and denotation of traditional Confucian“Xiangyuan”(乡愿),it can be found that Confucianism cannot judge the“reality”of“Xiangyuan”of the“others”from the outside,and in the perspective of Confucian family-centeredness,the various manifestations of the“Yuan”(愿)are often labeled as filial piety,but when expanded to the scope of“Xiang”(乡),they become the target of criticism.This reflects the moral philosophy of Confucianism.However,Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is basically consistent with Confucianism on the issue of“Xiangyuan”,that is,both oppose the hypocritical practice of“Xiangyuan”,but there are differences in details.From Kant’s view of“free will”and“categorical imperative”,it can be found that his judgment of“Xiangyuan”is based on“self”,and if“Xiangyuan”cannot be extended to the universal“Xiang”,then it cannot and should not be practiced in the small scope of“family”.In addition,Kant’s moral philosophy has insight into the existence of“radical evil”and provides an ontological defense for the existence of“third kind”“Xiangyuan”,while Confucianism clearly lacks reflection on the self-evident issues of“original heart”(本心)and“original nature”(本性).Therefore,it is necessary for us to rethink the criticism of Confucian“Xiangyuan”.

关 键 词：乡愿 儒学 康德 道德 根本恶 

分 类 号：B2[哲学宗教—中国哲学]