高管薪酬激励、真实盈余管理和企业高质量发展  

Executive Compensation Incentive,Real Earnings Management and High-quality Development of Enterprises

作　　者：胡盼 章文波[1] HU Pan;ZHANG Wenbo(School of Economics,Management and Law,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang 330038,China)

机构地区：[1]江西科技师范大学经济管理与法学院,南昌330038

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第17期84-89,共6页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：2023年度江西科技师范大学硕士研究生创新专项资金(YC2023-X10)。

摘　　要：选取2010—2022年沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,检验高管薪酬激励对企业全要素生产率的影响,探究真实盈余管理在其中是否发挥中介作用,根据产权性质进行异质性分析。结果表明:高管薪酬激励与企业全要素生产率之间存在显著正向关系,同时真实盈余管理在其中发挥部分中介作用;异质性检验发现在非国有企业中,高管薪酬激励显著抑制真实盈余管理行为,而国有企业中并不显著。基于此,从“奖”与“惩”两方面为促进企业高质量发展提出建议。The panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022 was selected to test the impact of executive compensation incentives on the total factor productivity of enterprises,whether real earnings management plays an intermediary role is explored,and heterogeneity analysis according to the nature of property rights was conducted.The results show that there is a significant positive relationship between executive compensation incentive and total factor productivity,and real earnings management plays a partial intermediary role.Heterogeneity test shows that executive compensation incentives significantly inhibit real earnings management behavior in non-state-owned enterprises,but not in state-owned enterprises.Based on this,suggestions are put forward for promoting the high-quality development of enterprises from the aspects of“reward”and“punishment”.

关 键 词：高管薪酬激励 真实盈余管理 企业高质量发展 全要素生产率 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]