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作 者:何浩楠 曾小芹 赵杰 HE Hao-nan;ZENG Xiao-qin;ZHAO Jie(Chang an University,Xi an,Shaanxi 710064)
机构地区:[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064
出 处:《供应链管理》2024年第10期33-43,共11页SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目“基于研发效率评估的传统车企电动化复合政策牵引机制与协调策略研究”(72104034)。
摘 要:随着共享经济的发展,越来越多的汽车制造商和共享汽车平台加入共享汽车行业。但截至目前,共享汽车仍未找到稳定的商业模式。基于这一现实情况,文章针对由单个汽车制造商和单个共享汽车平台组成的供应链系统,构建了分散式决策、成本分担契约决策、收益共享契约决策三种场景下的博弈模型,在考虑共享汽车服务水平的同时,分析制造商与平台对于成本分担契约与收益共享契约的决策。研究表明:服务水平的提高并不总能使平台获益。当收益共享比例取值处于区间内时,制造商和平台更倾向于采用收益共享契约进行合作。当收益共享比例很低或较高时,制造商和平台则通过成本分担契约开展合作。With the development of the sharing economy,more and more auto manufacturers and car-sharing platforms have joined the car-sharing industry.However,up to now,the car-sharing industry has not yet found a stable business model.Based on this reality,this paper constructs a game model under three scenarios of decentralised decision-making,cost-sharing contract decision-making,and revenue-sharing contract decision-making for a supply chain system consisting of a single auto manufacturer and a single car-sharing platform,and analyses the decision-making of the manufacturer and the platform for the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract while considering the level of service of sharing-cars.The study shows that an increase in service level does not always benefit the platform.When the value of the revenue sharing ratio is within the range,manufacturers and platforms are more inclined to cooperate with the revenue-sharing contract.When the revenue sharing ratio is very low or high,manufacturers and platforms cooperate through cost-sharing contracts.
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