业绩预告与管理层薪酬契约中的“预期管理”——基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

Earnings Forecast and Expectation Management in Compensation Contract:Empirical Research Based on Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：郭栋 肖星[2] Guo Dong;Xiao Xing(Postdoctoral Research Center,Industrial and Commercial Bank of China;School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University)

机构地区：[1]中国工商银行博士后科研工作站 [2]清华大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2024年第6期172-183,196,共13页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：业绩预告是资本市场中重要的信息披露机制,不同于以往文献单纯从外部资本市场的角度研究业绩预告,本文关注了业绩预告在企业内部决策中的作用。利用我国A股上市公司在2004-2020年公布的管理层业绩预告,本文研究了管理层借助业绩预告影响企业内部薪酬契约中业绩考核目标的预期管理行为。研究发现与其他时间相比,管理层在绩效考核目标确定之前做出的业绩预告更偏于悲观。这种悲观倾向与绩效考核目标选择、管理层权力和公司相对业绩表现密切相关,当管理层薪酬-业绩(净利润)联系更加紧密、管理层在职消费越多及公司相对业绩表现更差时,管理层做出的业绩预告更加悲观。此外,有效的内部治理机制,如两职分离、降低管理层持股比例可以对管理层的预期管理行为产生一定的抑制作用。最后,研究还发现业绩预告的悲观程度与管理层下一年度得到的货币薪酬正相关,这在一定程度上说明董事会并未完全识别出管理层的预期管理行为。本文的结果佐证了业绩预告的内外部“双重信息”属性,表明管理层利用向外部投资者披露的业绩预测在内部决策中“暗度陈仓”,也为改进公司薪酬契约的设计提供了有益参考。Traditional research on management performance forecast holds that management performance forecast is an important exter-nal information disclosure mechanism of listed companies,which helps alleviate the information asymmetry between external inves-tors and companies,and has an important impact on investor behav-ior and stock price.However,because shareholders are naturally at an information disadvantage relative to management,management's performance forecast may also become a complementary source of information for internal decision-making.Therefore,management's performance forecast may have the attribute of internal and external"dual information."So,how does the management take into account the needs of external investors and internal decision-making when issuing the earnings forecast?In particular,when the internal deci-sion-making involves the vital interests of the management,will the management distort the performance forecast out of self-interest,thus sacrificing the role of the performance forecast in external in-formation communication?The compensation contract is one of the internal decisions that the management pays the most attention to and is directly related to the personal interests of the management.In practice,compensation contracts often contain a performance target.This paper selects the performance forecast released before the firm sets the performance target of annual compensation con-tract as the research object,and explores whether the management will distort the external performance forecast for the sake of person-al compensation,and the consequences of this behavior in the firm's internal decision-making and external capital market.It is common for management to be assessed for performance and paid based on achievement of targets.The research finds that the management will achieve or beat the performance target in two abnormal ways out of self-interest motivation:one is ex-post earnings management,and the other is ex-ante expectation management,that is,it influences the target itself by

关 键 词：业绩预告 预期管理 绩效考核目标 薪酬契约 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92