政府信息披露对食品企业认证行为实施的影响  

Government Information Disclosure and Enterprise Certification

作　　者：王煜 周洁红[2] WANG Yu;ZHOU Jiehong(Institute of Rural Development,Zhejiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences,Hangzhou 310021;China Academy of Rural Development,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江省农业科学院农村发展研究所,杭州310021 [2]浙江大学中国农村发展研究院,杭州310058

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第6期141-151,共11页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA106);浙江省社科规划办重大项目“全面形成绿色生产生活方式研究”。

摘　　要：信息工具,尤其是政府公开信息的使用将极大改善市场中的信息不对称问题,是提升食品质量安全水平的重要手段。为探究政府信息披露的食品质量安全治理效应,从食品企业出发,基于理论和实证探究了客观政府食品质量安全抽检信息公示形成的声誉对于企业第三方认证行为的激励效果。结果表明:企业所在地区内所涉行业集体声誉的恶化将有效提升企业实施第三方认证的概率和数量;个体声誉在长期累积下也将有效激励企业实施第三方认证数量;邻近地区集体声誉损失将对企业实施认证行为产生负向影响;上述相应激励效应在小规模企业和东部地区更为显著。The use of information tools,especially public government information,will greatly improve the information asymmetry in the market and is an important tool to enhance food quality and safety.To identify the effect of government information disclosure on food quality and safety,this paper explores the incentive effects of reputation formed by the public disclosure of government food quality and safety sampling information on firms’certification behavior through theoretical and empirical evidence.The results show that the collective reputation of the same industry in the region where the firm is located will effectively incentivize the probability and quantity of third party certification;individual reputation will also effectively encourage firms to implement the quantity of third party certification under long-term accumulation.Conversely,the loss of collective reputation in neighboring regions will negatively affect the implementation of certification by firms.These effects are more significant in small firms and in eastern China.

关 键 词：信息披露 食品质量安全 集体声誉 认证行为 

分 类 号：F423.3[经济管理—产业经济]