高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系研究——基于英国证券业与制造业的实证分析  

On the Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance--Empirical Analysis Based on the UK Securities and Manufacturing Industries

作　　者：徐辰茹 XU Chen-ru(Hefei College of Finance&Economics,Hefei 230000,China)

机构地区：[1]合肥财经职业学院,安徽合肥230000

出　　处：《哈尔滨学院学报》2024年第10期65-70,共6页Journal of Harbin University

基　　金：安徽省青年骨干教师境内访学研修资助项目,项目编号:JNFX2023190。

摘　　要：在当代企业治理结构中,委托代理问题使得企业业绩成为评估高管薪酬的核心指标。随着知识经济时代的到来,杰出的高管团队已成为企业的核心竞争力,其薪酬激励机制显得尤为关键。文章基于相关理论,运用规范与实证研究方法,选取英国证券业和制造业的200家公司作为研究样本;以资本回报率和毛利润作为衡量企业业绩的指标,以董事薪酬代表高管薪酬,通过描述性统计分析方法展现两个行业董事薪酬的现状;运用回归分析方法检验高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的相关性,并对两个行业进行比较。基于研究结果,提出了建立科学合理的董事薪酬评估机制、加强对高管薪酬的监督以及提高薪酬透明度等政策建议。In contemporary corporate governance structures,the principal-agent problem makes corporate performance the core indicator for evaluating executive compensation.With the advent of the knowledge economy era,outstanding executive teams have become the core competitiveness of enterprises,and their compensation incentive mechanisms are particularly crucial.The article is based on relevant theories and uses normative and empirical research methods to select 200 companies in the UK securities and manufacturing industries as research samples.Using return on capital and gross profit as indicators to measure corporate performance,and director compensation as a representative of executive compensation,this study presents the current status of director compensation in two industries through descriptive statistical analysis methods with regression analysis to examine the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance,and comparing the two industries.Based on the research results,policy recommendations have been proposed to establish a scientific and reasonable mechanism for evaluating director compensation,strengthen supervision of executive compensation,and improve compensation transparency.

关 键 词：企业业绩 董事薪酬 证券业 制造业 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]