敬重、召唤与承认:霍耐特承认理论视域中的德国观念论  

Respect,Summons and Recognition:German Idealism in the Perspective of Honneth’s Recognition Theory

作　　者：洪楼 Hong Lou

机构地区：[1]厦门大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《德国哲学》2024年第1期210-221,272,273,共14页Chinese Journal of German Philosophy

基　　金：福建省社会科学基金项目“卢卡奇物化理论的当代诠释研究”(项目编号:FJ2023B115)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在霍耐特看来,我们今天所理解的“承认”术语的理论起源及其完整意义(主体间的相互承认),只有到了近代早期的德国哲学中才初现端倪。承认观念在德国首先是借助康德的“敬重”概念获得了突破性进展,但它所包含的“平等主体之间的相互承认”,并未展开。在费希特的法权演绎中,“召唤”是互动主体彼此充分理解和交往的必要条件,他试图通过将敬重完全归结为理性召唤来解决康德的敬重疑难,但这种单纯依赖理性的构成性活动的做法,难以真正得到广泛认可。相比于康德和费希特的先验色彩,黑格尔的承认概念具有更多历史的、经验性的内容,他论述了在精神自我实现的历史过程中制度化组织的承认关系,同时,还强调了在不平等社会秩序中为承认而斗争的可能性。对德国观念论的这一独特的思想史重构是霍耐特深化其承认理论的又一次尝试。Honneth argues that the theoretical origin and complete meaning of the term“recognition”that we understand today,i?e?,mutual recognition between subjects,only emerged in early modern German philosophy?The conception of recognition in Germany first achieved breakthrough progress through Kant’s concept of“Respect”,but its connotation of“mutual recognition between equal subjects”had not been demonstrated?In Fichte’s deduction of rights,“summons”was a necessary condition for the interactive subjects to fully understand and interact with each other?He attempted to completely ascribe respect to rational summoning to solve Kant’s problem of respect?However,this approach of relying solely on rational constitutive activities was difficult to truly gain widespread acceptation?Compared to the transcendentalism of Kant and Fichte,Hegel’s concept of recognition had more historical and empirical content,elaborating the recognition relationship of institutionalized organizations in the historical process of self-realization of Geist?In the meanwhile,Hegel also emphasized the possibility of struggling for recognition in unequal social order?This unique reconstruction of the intellectual history of German idealism is another attempt by Honneth to deepen his own theory of recognition?

关 键 词：霍耐特 承认理论 德国观念论 

分 类 号：B516.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]