委托代理理论视角下的政府产教融合激励策略  

Analysis of Government's Incentive Strategy for Promoting Industry-Education Integration from the Principal-Agent Theory Perspective

作　　者：多淑杰[1] 郑琦[2] Duo Shujie;Zheng Qi

机构地区：[1]中山职业技术学院经济管理学院 [2]中山职业技术学院

出　　处：《高等工程教育研究》2024年第5期116-120,共5页Research in Higher Education of Engineering

基　　金：国家社科基金“十三五”规划教育学一般课题“产教融合组织形态及其治理结构优化研究”(BJA190098)。

摘　　要：教育是具有正外部性的准公共品,单纯依靠市场机制难以解决产教融合的“社会困境”,需要政府设计合理有效的契约进行激励。通过委托代理模型分析政府产教融合激励契约表明,基于产出能力和合作效应设计激励契约、实施差异化激励,有助于克服代理人道德风险和逆向选择问题。根据产教融合企业行业特征、层次及实际贡献度制定差异化激励策略,通过规范劳动力用工制度、建立实习保险基金制度、提高校企资源对接效能等,降低校企参与产教融合风险预期和努力成本边际,从而实现对校企高效激励。The education is a quasi-public goods with positive externalities.It is difficult to solve the “social dilemma”of industry-education integration by relying only on market mechanism,and the government needs to design reasonable and effective incentive contracts.Based on the principal-agent model,this paper studies the incentive contract design of industry-education integration between government,schools and enterprises.The results show that the government designs incentive contracts based on the industry-education integration capacity and cooperation effect,and implementing differentiated incentive can help to overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection problems of agents.According to the industry characteristics,levels and actual contributions of the industry-education integration,differentiated incentive strategies are formulated.By standardizing the labor employment system,establishing the internship insurance fund system,improving the efficiency of resource connection about school and enterprise,the risk expectation and effort cost margin of the industry-education integration are reduced,so as to achieve efficient incentives for school enterprises.

关 键 词：产教融合 委托代理理论 不对称信息 激励策略 

分 类 号：G719.2[文化科学—职业技术教育学]