中小股东诉讼的治理效应研究——基于大股东利益侵占的证据  

The Governance Effects of Minority Shareholder Litigation:Evidence from the Majority Shareholder Tunneling

作　　者：陈运森[1,2] 于耀 赵瑞瑞 Chen Yunsen;Yu Yaoa;Zhao Ruirui(School of Accounting,Central University of Finance and Economics;China's Management Accounting Research&Development Center,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Chemical Technology)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院 [2]中央财经大学中国管理会计研究与发展中心 [3]北京化工大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2024年第12期200-215,共16页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“随机监管的资本市场经济后果及监管联动性研究:基于证监会双随机检查的准自然实验”(基金号:72272168);北京社科基金青年学术带头人项目“证券监管效率提升与企业高质量发展”(基金号:24DTR029)的资助。

摘　　要：本文立足中国特色现代资本市场的重要私人实施机制,手工搜集上市公司中小股东诉讼数据,检验中小股东诉讼的实际治理效应。结果发现:上市公司中小股东诉讼具有增量治理效应,能够显著抑制大股东利益侵占行为。分析中小股东诉讼强度发现,原告涉案人数、涉案金额以及案件关注度越高,治理效应越强;此外,中小股东诉讼的治理效应因企业内部股权结构、治理特征、外部治理环境和所处行业特征的不同而变化。事件研究发现,被中小股东诉讼的公司股价会经历显著的下跌,而市场反应越负面,中小股东诉讼的治理效果越明显。基于中小股东诉讼特征分析发现,当中小股东诉讼的案件诉由直接与大股东利益侵占相关、被告包含公司的大股东、受理法院是金融法院时,对大股东利益侵占行为的治理效果更为显著。最后,法律基础建设对提升中小股东诉讼的治理效应具有促进作用。本文结果表明中小股东诉讼对大股东利益侵占具有实际的治理作用,为完善中国特色现代资本市场监管及投资者保护提供了启示。This study analyzes litigation data from minority shareholders of listed companies,demonstrating the significant governance ef⁃fects that inhibit major shareholder tunneling.The governance effect strengthens with an increase in the number of plaintiffs,the amount at stake,and the level of attention a case receives.Moreover,it varies with changes in the firm's ownership structure,governance characteristics,external governance environment,and industry characteristics.Event studies show that companies sued by minority shareholders experience sig⁃nificant stock price declines;furthermore,a more pronounced negative market reaction corresponds to a stronger governance effect of such liti⁃gation.Further analysis indicates that the governance effect is more significant in three specific scenarios:when the cause of action directly re⁃lates to expropriation by major shareholders,when the defendants include the company's major shareholders,and when the accepting court is a financial court.The revised Securities Law promotes this governance outcome.These results demonstrate that minority shareholder litigation effectively deters major shareholder tunneling,offering insights for enhancing supervision and investor protection in China's modern capital market.

关 键 词：股东诉讼 证券监管 投资者保护 大股东利益侵占 

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