帕菲特对人格同一性的反驳及其伦理意义  

Parfit’s Objection to Personal Identity and Its Ethical Significance

作　　者：阮航[1] RUAN Hang

机构地区：[1]湖北大学哲学学院,武汉430062

出　　处：《求是学刊》2024年第6期43-55,共13页Seeking Truth

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“帕菲特的伦理理论及其当代效应研究”(20BZX112)。

摘　　要：针对其所整理的人格同一性经典观点,帕菲特在《理与人》中分别提出了有力的反驳:一是如果遵循还原论观点,人格同一性就将成为一个无法提供具有实质意义答案的空洞问题;二是就非还原论而言,像笛卡尔式自我这样的精神实体缺乏充分的经验证据,反而有大量否定它的证据;作为“进一步事实”观点的支撑点,对经验主体的预设并非必要,因为非人称式描述是完全可能的。帕菲特由此得出的结论是:人格同一性并不重要,重要的是由于恰当类型的原因而产生的心理关联性和心理连续性,亦即其所谓关系R。他进而分析了这些观点产生的两大原因:一是原子式个人的预设,二是个人自我延存的自然愿望。帕菲特反驳的主旨其实在于伦理的层面。在《理与人》中,帕菲特的反驳实际上是针对作为自利论理论基础的原子式个人预设,进而批判西方主流伦理理论采取的个人主义视角。该反驳在《论重要之事》中的后续发展主要表现为对康德伦理学元伦理层面的批判以及对其规范伦理的修正。帕菲特的反驳不仅揭示了西方主流伦理学个人主义视角的内在问题,而且表明了它们在应对当代诸多重大现实问题方面都存在根本的缺陷。In response to the classical view of personal identity that he has compiled,Parfit in Reason and Man puts forward strong objection to each of the following:firstly,if the reductionism is followed,personal identity will become an empty question that cannot provide an answer of substance;secondly,in terms of non-reductionism,there is insufficient empirical evidence for a mental entity such as the Cartesian ego,but instead,there is a great deal of evidence to disprove it.As a support for the“further facts”view,the presupposition of empirical subjects is not necessary,since impersonal descriptions are perfectly possible.Parfit thus concludes that it is not personal identity that matters,but rather the psychological relatedness and continuity for the right kinds of reasons,what he calls the relation R.He then analyses the two main reasons for these views:the presuppositions of the atomic individual,and the natural desire for the individual’s self-perpetuation.Parfit’s objection aims at the ethical dimension.In Reasons and Persons,his objection is actually directed at the presupposition of the atomic individual as the basis of the theory of self-interest,and then criticizes the individualistic perspective adopted by the mainstream Western ethical theory.The subsequent development of this objection in On What Matters is primarily a critique of the meta-ethical dimension of Kantian ethics and a revision of its normative ethics.Parfit’s objection not only reveals the inherent problems with the individualistic perspective of mainstream Western ethics,but also demonstrates that they are fundamentally flawed in responding to many of the major realities of our time.

关 键 词：帕菲特 人格同一性 经典观点 反驳 伦理意义 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学] B038