对燃油车限行还是摇号?——新能源汽车发展的政策选择研究  被引量:1

License plate policy or license plate lottery for fuel vehicles?——Study on policy options for the development of new energy vehicles

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作  者:王滔 陈卓 颜波[3] WANG Tao;CHEN Zhuo;YAN Bo(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China;School of Medical Business,Guangdong Pharmaceutical University,Zhongshan 528458,China;School of Economics and Finance,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区:[1]广东财经大学工商管理学院,广州510320 [2]广东药科大学医药商学院,中山528458 [3]华南理工大学经济与金融学院,广州510006

出  处:《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第11期3571-3585,共15页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基  金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871098);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金自然科学基金面上项目(2022A1515010277);2024年度广州市基础与应用基础研究专题项目(2024A04J4078)。

摘  要:为缓解交通压力,我国多个城市出台各类限制燃油车的政策,这在一定程度上影响了新能源车与燃油车之间的竞争.基于上述现实,本文在考虑消费者对新能源车存在续航或补能焦虑的情况下,构建由一个燃油车企和一个新能源车企组成的汽车市场竞争决策模型,通过分析政府对燃油车采取摇号、限行、摇号加限行三种政策情形下两类车企的最优决策,并对各政策下的均衡结果进行比较,探讨燃油车企和新能源车企在需求和收益方面占优政策选择的阈值条件.研究结果表明,第一,在摇号政策下两车企总能实现最优收益,而只有当限行政策引发消费者对燃油车的焦虑程度低于消费者对新能源车的焦虑程度时,限行政策和摇号加限行政策下两类车企才能实现收益最优;第二,在限行政策的基础上若政府再对燃油车进行摇号限制并不会改变两类车的价格.第三,从需求和收益角度来讲,摇号加限行政策不能成为燃油车企的占优选择,而限行政策不能成为新能源车企的占优选择,当消费者对燃油车和新能源车的焦虑程度都较大时,摇号政策能够同时成为两类车企的占优选择.然而,当政府对燃油车的摇号资格限制条件越严格时,摇号政策同时成为两类车企占优选择的可能性就越小.In order to alleviate traffic pressure,multiple cities in China have introduced various policies restricting the fuel vehicles,which to some extent has affected the competition between the new energy vehicles and the fuel vehicles.Based on the above reality,this paper constructs an automobile market competition decision-making model composed of a fuel vehicle automaker and a new energy vehicle automaker in consideration of consumers’anxiety about the new energy vehicles’range or energy replenishment.This paper analyzes the optimal decision-making of the two types of automakers under the government’s three policy scenarios(license plate policy,license plate lottery,and the combination of the above two policies),and compares the equilibrium results of the various policies scenarios to explore the threshold conditions for the dominant policy choice of these two automakers in terms of demand and profit.The results show that these two automakers can always realize the optimal profits under the license plate policy,while they can realize the optimal profits under the license plate lottery and the combination of these two policies only when the degree of anxiety of consumers about the fuel vehicles caused by the license plate lottery is lower than that of the new energy vehicles.In addition,the license plate lottery and the license plate policy will not change the prices of these two types of vehicles.Finally,from the perspective of demand and profit,the combination of the license plate policy and the license plate lottery cannot be an optimal choice for the fuel vehicle automaker,while the license plate lottery cannot be an optimal choice for the new energy vehicle automaker.When consumers are highly anxious about the fuel vehicles and the new energy vehicles,the license plate policy can be an optimal choice for these two types of vehicle automakers.However,as the government imposes stricter restrictions on the lottery of the fuel vehicles,the likelihood that the license plate policy becomes a predominant choice

关 键 词:新能源车 燃油车 摇号 限行 

分 类 号:F272[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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