高管薪酬激励、战略变革与资源型企业全要素生产率  

Executive Compensation Incentive,Strategic Change and Total Factor Productivity of Resource-Based Enterprises

作　　者：郑明贵[1] 徐芳玉 董娟 ZHENG Minggui;XU Fangyu;DONG Juan(Mining Development Research Center,Jiangxi University of Science and Technology,Ganzhou 341000,Jiangxi,China)

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学矿业发展研究中心,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《黄金科学技术》2024年第6期1130-1142,共13页Gold Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“中国战略性矿产资源产业链供应链安全稳定战略研究(2025—2060)”(编号:22XGL003);江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地江西理工大学矿业发展研究中心2022年度重大招标课题“突发环境下战略性矿产资源产业战略管理理论与方法”(编号:KYZX2022-1);江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目“要素投入结构对资源型企业绿色全要素生产率的影响研究”(编号:GJJ2200870);江西理工大学经济管理学院博士科研启动基金项目“ICT资本深化对资源型企业绿色发展的影响效应与机制研究”联合资助。

摘　　要：基于2012—2023年中国沪深A股资源型上市企业数据,研究了高管薪酬激励与资源型企业全要素生产率之间的关系。研究发现:(1)高管薪酬激励对资源型企业全要素生产率产生先促进后抑制的倒U型影响,且该影响在非国有、产业链下游以及成长期、衰退期的资源型企业中更为明显。(2)战略变革在高管薪酬激励与资源型企业全要素生产率之间起着中介作用,合理的高管薪酬激励会推动资源型企业战略变革,进而提升全要素生产率;过高的高管薪酬激励则会阻碍资源型企业战略变革,进而降低全要素生产率。(3)产品市场竞争在高管薪酬激励对资源型企业全要素生产率的影响中起着倒U型调节作用,使曲线形态变平缓,拐点右移。提高产品市场竞争程度,能够提升高管薪酬激励的优化效应,降低损害效应的增长速度,并有助于发挥高管薪酬激励的长期导向作用。研究结论丰富了高管薪酬激励与企业全要素生产率的理论框架,对企业制定高管薪酬激励契约以及提升决策效率具有一定的启示。This study investigates the relationship between executive compensation incentives and the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises,utilizing data from China Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share resource-based listed companies from 2012 to 2023.The findings indicate that:(1)Executive compensation incentives exhibit an inverted U-shaped effect on the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.This impact is particularly pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises situated downstream in the industrial chain,and resource-based enterprises during their growth and decline phases.(2)Strategic change serves as an intermediary mechanism linking executive compensation incentives to the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.Appropriately calibrated executive compensation incentives facilitate strategic change within these enterprises,subsequently enhancing their total factor productivity.Conversely,excessively high executive compensation incentives may impede strategic change,thereby diminishing total factor productivity.(3)Product market competition exhibits an inverted U-shaped moderating effect on the relationship between executive compensation incentives and the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.This competition smooths the curve and shifts the turning point to the right.Enhancing the level of competition within the product market can optimize the efficacy of executive compensation incentives,mitigate the rate of detrimental effects,and support the long-term strategic role of these incentives.The conclusion have important decision enlightenment for resource-based enterprises to reasonably formulate incentive contract of executive compensation and improve total factor productivity.

关 键 词：高管薪酬激励 全要素生产率 战略变革 产品市场竞争 资源型企业 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]