源于他人证言的道德知识  

Moral Knowledge from Others’Testimony

作　　者：王奇琦 WANG Qi-qi(School of Marxism,Xiamen University,Xiamen Fujian 361005,China;Epistemology and Cognitive Science Research Center,Xiamen University,Xiamen Fujian 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学马克思主义学院,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第6期52-58,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“当代知识论的系列研究”(14ZDB012)。

摘　　要：在日常生活中,人们默认彼此持有普遍的善恶是非观念,具备基本的道德认知能力。然而,道德知识的可能性和地位一直遭受怀疑论者的挑战和质疑。近期一种捍卫道德知识的思路是将道德证言与一般证言进行比较,这为论证道德知识的可能性提供了一个新的视角。对该思路的深入考察发现,其实质是证言知识的反还原论立场。这一立场存在一系列困难,例如难以处理道德分歧难题,以及难以解释道德专家的存在,并导致对道德知识范围的不当放大。克服这些弊端的方式在于引入置信度概念,发展道德证言的还原论,以彰显社会交往中的实践理性,避免道德认知中的盲从与轻信。In daily life,people believe others have general moral views and basic moral cognitive abilities.Howev⁃er,the possibility and status of moral knowledge have sparked widespread controversy in the field of moral episte⁃mology.Some scholars have recently argued that moral testimony is not fundamentally different from other forms of testimony,which presents a new perspective on the possibility of moral knowledge.The paper discovers that the view above is known as Anti-Reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Anti-reductionism of moral testimo⁃ny faces several challenges,such as addressing the issue of moral disagreement,explaining moral expertise,and mistakenly expanding the scope of moral knowledge.To address these challenges,the concept of credence is intro⁃duced,and a reductionist approach to moral testimony is developed.By doing so,we emphasize the importance of practical rationality in social interaction and avoid following others blindly and being irrationally gullible.

关 键 词：证言 道德证言 道德知识 道德知识论 知识论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]