共同机构投资者与企业债务违约风险  

Common Institutional Investors and Corporate Debt Default Risk

作　　者：刘杨方姝 易志高[1] LIU Yangfangshu;YI Zhigao(School of Business,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2025年第1期28-41,共14页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“企业数据资产信息披露行为选择、经济后果与对策研究”(24AJY034)。

摘　　要：本文以2008—2021年非金融类A股上市公司为样本,考察共同机构投资者对企业债务违约风险的影响。研究发现,共同机构投资者显著降低了企业的债务违约风险。机制分析表明,共同机构投资者通过缓解融资约束、降低经营风险以及减少代理成本进而降低企业的债务违约风险。进一步分析发现,共同机构投资者能通过内部化企业违约行为造成的负外部性而对债务违约风险产生更强的抑制作用。异质性分析表明,当管理层持股比例处于“管理层防御”区间、企业审计质量较低以及宏观经济增速下降时,共同机构投资者对债务违约风险的抑制效应更强。此外,持股类型和持股期限不同的共同机构投资者发挥的作用也存在异质性,压力抵制型和长期共同机构投资者更能显著抑制企业的债务违约风险。This paper examines the impact of common institutional investors on corporate debt default risk in a sample of non-financial A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2021.It is found that common institutional investors significantly reduce firms'debt default risk.The mechanism analysis suggests that common institutional investors reduce corporate debt default risk by alleviating financing constraints,lowering business risks,and reducing agency costs.Further analysis reveals that common institutional investors can create a stronger disincentive to debt default risk by internalizing the negative externalities caused by corporate defaults.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the dampening effect of common institutional investors on debt default risk is stronger when management shareholding is in the defensive range,when audit quality is low,and when macroeconomic growth is declining.In addition,there is heterogeneity in the role played by common institutional investors with different shareholding types and duration,with stress-resistant and long-term common institutional investors significantly dampening the risk of debt default.

关 键 词：共同机构投资者 债务违约风险 融资约束 经营风险 代理成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]