碳税和基金补贴下废旧手机闭环供应链回收决策  

Closed-loop Supply Chain Recycling Decision of Used Mobile Phones under Carbon Tax and Fund Subsidy

作　　者：廖红英 孟芳[1] LIAO Hongying;MENG Fang(College of Automotive and Traffic Engineering,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430065,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学汽车与交通工程学院,湖北武汉430065

出　　处：《物流科技》2025年第3期96-100,108,共6页Logistics Sci Tech

摘　　要：基于双碳的理念对废旧手机回收进行研究,引入政府补贴、基金和碳税等参数,针对制造商、销售商以及第三方回收处理商各自建立互联网回收平台进行废旧手机回收再制造问题,分别构建Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法求解并分析了政府补贴和碳税对废旧手机回收再制造决策的影响。结果表明,一方面,由于碳税的引入导致产品定价上升,进而导致制造商、销售商及供应链总利润下降。另一方面,政府给予补贴,使得废旧手机的回收量逐步增加,制造商、销售商及供应链总利润也呈上升趋势。Based on the concept of double carbon,this paper studies the recycling of waste mobile phones,introduces parameters such as government subsidies,funds and carbon taxes,and establishes internet recycling platforms for manufacturers,retailers and third-party recyclers to recycle and remanufacture waste mobile phones.Stackelberg game models are constructed respectively,and the effects of government subsidies and carbon taxes on the recycling and remanufacturing decisions of waste mobile phones are solved and analyzed by backward induction.The results show that,on the one hand,the introduction of carbon tax leads to the increase of product pricing,which in turn leads to the decrease of the total profit of manufacturers,sellers and supply chain.On the other hand,government subsidies have gradually increased the recycling volume of used mobile phones,and the total profits of manufacturers,sellers and supply chains have also shown an upward trend.

关 键 词：废旧手机 闭环供应链 政府参与 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]