基于质量信念的竞争零售商退款保证策略研究——面向体验式学习型消费者  

Money-back guarantees of competing retailers based on quality belief when facing experiential-learning consumers

作　　者：宋亚楠 刘璐 李婷婷[2,3] 闫相斌 赵恩珑 SONG Yanan;LIU Lu;LI Tingting;YAN Xiangbin;ZHAO Enlong(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China;School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance&Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Key Laboratory of Liaoning Province for Data Analytics and Decision-Making Optimization,Dalian 116025,China;School of Business,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangdong 510420,China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,大连116025 [3]辽宁省大数据管理与优化决策重点实验室,大连116025 [4]广东外语外贸大学商学院,广东510420

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第12期4026-4044,共19页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金国家杰出青年科学项目(72025101);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72271023,71971047);国家自然科学基金重大项目(72394372)。

摘　　要：本文基于指数平滑模型和Logit选择模型刻画了消费者的多期购买行为,构建了在不同退款保证策略下两异质零售商的收益模型,探讨了退款保证策略对体验式学习型消费者购买可能性和零售商收益的影响,并进一步分析了AI赋能消费者决策的影响.研究发现,由于商品质量波动和消费者的体验式学习,消费者关于商品平均质量的信念低于商品真实的平均质量.不同的退款保证策略下消费者会形成不同的商品质量信念.零售商提供且对手零售商不提供退款保证有助于消费者形成最接近商品真实平均质量的信念.零售商并不总能从提供退款保证中获益,当单位退货成本较低时,提供退款保证是零售商的占优策略.随着退货成本的提高,两零售商退款保证策略的博弈均衡由两零售商都提供退款保证逐渐转变为都不提供.数值算例表明,退款保证策略的均衡存在“囚徒困境”现象.具体地,当退货成本较低时,均衡是两个零售商都提供退款保证,但此时二者收益低于都不提供退款保证时的收益.这表明竞争会促使双方都选择提供退款保证,尽管这并不能使零售商的收益最优.AI赋能消费者决策下,质量波动较大的零售商的长期收益提升.退货成本较低时,提供退款保证仍是零售商的占优策略,但AI赋能决策改变了零售商策略转变的阈值.Based on the exponential smoothing model and Logit choice model,this paper describes the multi-period purchase behavior of consumers,constructs the revenue model of two het-erogeneous retailers under different money-back guarantees, and discusses the impact of moneybackguarantees on experiential-learning consumers’ purchase likelihood and retailers’ revenues.We further investigate the changes brought about by the introduction of AI-assisted decisionmaking.We find that, due to the fluctuation of product quality and consumers’ experientiallearning,consumers’ beliefs about the average quality of products are lower than the real averagequality. Different money-back guarantees will affect consumers to form different beliefs aboutproduct quality. When the focal retailer provides money-back guarantees while the competingretailer not, consumers’ quality belief of the focal retailer is the closest to the real average quality.The retailers do not always benefit from offering money-back guarantees. When the unitreturn cost is low, it is the dominant strategy to offer money-back guarantees. As the returncost increases, the equilibrium of the two retailers’ money-back guarantees gradually changesfrom providing money-back guarantees to not. Numerical analysis shows that the equilibriumreached by two retailers has a phenomenon of Prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, when the returncost is low, both retailers provide the money-back guarantees in equilibrium, but the equilibriumrevenue of both retailers is lower than the revenue when no money-back guarantee is provided.This suggests that competition induces both retailers to choose to offer money-back guarantees,although it does not achieve the optimal retailer’s payoff optimal. After introducing AI-assisteddecision-making, retailers with large quality fluctuations obtain an increase in long-term profits.Offering money-back guarantees remains a dominant strategy when the return cost is low, butAI-assisted decision-making changes the threshold for strategy formulation

关 键 词：体验式学习 退款保证 竞争零售商 质量信念 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]