动机驱动的规范信念更新  

Motivated Belief Updating of Norms

作　　者：孟景轶 邹文博 秦海英[1] Meng Jingyi;Zou Wenbo;Qin Haiying(School of Economics,and The Laboratory for Economic Behaviors and Policy Simulation,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,南开大学经济行为与政策模拟实验室,300071

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2024年第12期246-263,共18页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：理论与实地实验研究”(EAE220109);教育部哲学社会科学实验室专项资金研究项目(H0123706)的资助。

摘　　要：社会规范在塑造个体道德行为方面发挥着重要作用。本文旨在探讨人们在可以通过撒谎来增加自身金钱收益但可能伤害他人的决策情境中,如何更新对描述性规范的信念。本文的研究结果发现,相较于那些未意识到自己将参与此类选择的旁观者,那些已参与并知道自己将再次做出选择的个体,在观察到他人诚实时,信念更新的幅度往往不足。这导致他们的后验信念比旁观者更加悲观,尽管二者的先验信念相似。这些结果不仅基本符合一个简单的动机驱动的信息处理理论模型,同时通过揭示主观信念与贝叶斯后验信念之间的关系,表明贝叶斯更新可能无法作为研究自利偏见的合适基准。Norms shape individuals’moral behavior.In the present paper,we investigate how people update their beliefs about the descriptive norm in a decision situation where one can lie to increase one’s own monetary payoff but potentially harm others.We find that in comparison to bystanders who are unaware they will be involved in such choices themselves,those who have involved and are aware that they will involve in such choices again tend to under-update when observing others telling the truth.As a result,they end up having more cynical posterior norm beliefs,despite that they have similar prior beliefs as the bystanders before receiving signals.While these results are partly consistent with a simple theoretical model of motivated information processing,the relationships between subjective and Bayesian posterior beliefs suggest that Bayesian updating may not be an appropriate benchmark to consider self-serving bias.

关 键 词：信念更新 自利偏见 规范遵从 撒谎行为 信号博弈 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]