程朱理学“不以迹论”的道德评价——以杨时、朱熹的方案为中心  

The Cheng-Zhu School on Moral Evaluation:Centered on the Solutions of Yang Shi and Zhu Xi

作　　者：王维昊 Wang Weihao

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871

出　　处：《管子学刊》2025年第1期61-72,共12页GuanZi Journal

摘　　要：西方哲学传统对道德评价问题的讨论,始终暗含一个预设:将道德主体——“人”首先理解为“行动者”,这显示出对道德行为的特别关注。然而,程朱理学脉络中道德评价问题的展开,却未必需要引入这一预设。一些程朱理学家的道德评价模式强调仁、迹之辨,在道德评价问题上近乎取消了道德行为的地位。此模式有显见的优势,也有根本的困难;朱熹尝试化解其困难,以完善之,最终建立起了以连续的动机考察为基础的道德评价模式。在此模式中,道德主体不作为“行动者”出现,道德评价的基本功能并非辨善恶而是识弊病,道德行动的目标不只是做“好事”而更是做“好人”。这一与西方传统迥异的、“中国的”道德评价模式,启发我们从根源处出发,重新思考当代道德评价问题展开的可能性。The discussion of moral evaluation in the Western philosophical tradition has always implied a presupposition that the moral subject,the person,is understood first and foremost as the“agent”,which shows a special concern for moral behavior.However,the development of moral evaluation in the Cheng-Zhu school does not necessarily require this presupposition.The moral evaluation model of some Cheng-Zhu scholars emphasizes the distinction between benevolence and behavior and nearly eliminates the status of moral behavior in the issue of moral evaluation.This model has obvious strengths and fundamental difficulties;Zhu Xi attempted to resolve the difficulties and to develop it.Finally,a model of moral evaluation based on the continuous examination of motivation was established.In this model,the moral subject does not appear as an“agent”,and the basic function of moral evaluation is not to identify good and evil but to recognize evils,and the goal of moral action is not only to“do good deeds”but also to be a“good person”.This“Chinese”model of moral evaluation,which is very different from the Western tradition,inspires us to rethink the possibilities for the development of contemporary moral evaluation from its roots.

关 键 词：杨时 朱熹 道德评价 自由意志 

分 类 号：B244[哲学宗教—中国哲学]