民营企业董事长薪酬是管理层的“紧箍咒”吗?——基于大股东专有性资产的解释  

Is the Chairman Compensation of Private Enterprises a“Tightening-crown Spell”for Executives?An Explanation Based on Large Shareholders’Specific Assets

作　　者：曹哲涵 刘浩[1,2] Cao Zhehan;Liu Hao(School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2024年第12期152-166,共15页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71772109,72072106,72272093);教育部重点研究基地重大项目(18JJD790011);高等学校学科创新引智计划(B18033)

摘　　要：在西方企业治理实践中,董事长薪酬普遍低于总经理薪酬,而中国民营企业则呈现截然相反的薪酬结构特征。文章基于中国独特的人格化交易背景,从理论层面揭示了这一现象的内在逻辑:民营企业大股东通常持有并维系重要的专有性资产,这使其能够将董事长薪酬作为管理层薪酬的约束与激励工具。文章实证研究发现,在中国民营企业中,董事长薪酬发挥显著的约束功能,体现为董事长薪酬水平显著高于管理层薪酬;同时,董事长薪酬具有激励功能,体现为管理层薪酬业绩敏感性显著高于董事长薪酬业绩敏感性。在机制检验方面,文章从大股东专有性资产的形成过程、具体内容与表现形式、持有形式以及稳定性四个维度,系统衡量了大股东专有性资产的重要程度,研究结果均支持了大股东专有性资产对这一约束与激励工具的重要影响。进一步研究表明,采用这类“紧箍咒”式薪酬工具既产生了降低管理层薪酬增速、减少第一类代理成本和提高管理效率等正面经济后果,也带来了较难吸引高质量管理人才和阻碍企业转型创新等负面经济影响。文章的研究深化了对中国民营企业薪酬结构的理论认知,为优化企业治理机制和提升治理效能提供了重要的政策启示,对于推动中国特色现代企业制度建设具有重要的现实意义。The compensation of the Western chairman is generally lower than that of the CEO,but in Chinese private enterprises,the opposite is true.Based on the unique context of personalized transactions in China,large shareholders usually own and develop important specific assets.The fundamental role of these specific assets in the value creation process,as well as the information and knowledge they provide,makes chairman compensation a constraint and incentive tool for executive compensation.This paper finds that in Chinese private enterprises,chairman compensation is a constraint tool for executive compensation,manifested as chairman compensation being significantly higher than executive compensation;chairman compensation is an incentive tool for executive compensation,manifested as significantly higher performance sensitivity of executive compensation than that of chairman compensation.The mechanism test supports the significant impact of large shareholders’specific assets on this tool.The economic consequence test finds that,although this tool reduces the growth rate of executive compensation and first-class agency costs,and improves management efficiency,it hinders the introduction of management talents,and the transformation and innovation of enterprises.The contributions of this paper are as follows:First,it discusses for the first time the constraint and incentive effects of chairman compensation on executive compensation in Chinese private enterprises,and provides an explanation based on large shareholders’specific assets,providing a framework of“chairman-executive compensation theory”in the Chinese context for understanding the differences in compensation contracts between China and the West.Second,it introduces China’s personalized transactions and the theory of large shareholders’specific assets into compensation contracts,expanding the research of property rights theory in the compensation contract design.Third,it presents the low-cost solution to the first-class agency issue in China,enriching th

关 键 词：董事长薪酬 管理层薪酬 大股东专有性资产 约束 激励 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]