拯救“好人”概念:一个可能尝试  

Saving the Concept of a “Good Person”: A Possible Attempt

作　　者：冯书生 FENG Shu-sheng

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学哲学院 [2]中国社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《河北学刊》2025年第2期131-140,共10页Hebei Academic Journal

摘　　要：“好人”概念在结构上是知、思、习三位一体的,有“知”能“思”,加之在实践上磨练以养成适度的习惯,才能成为“好人”。无论在古代社会还是现代社会,“做好人”都不是一件轻松的事。不同于具体德性,“好人”是一个德性本源概念,不会因社会结构的变化而变化。“好人”之难做与传统社会向现代社会的变迁无关,而是根源于人本身的脆弱性和有限性。我们之所以观察到传统社会的“好人”观念在现代社会的冷遇,是因为传统社会与现代社会的信任机制不同,前者为伦理,后者为制度。无论在何种社会形态,做好人的要求及困境都是相通的。但不管是传统伦理的关系性推演,还是现代制度的工具性逻辑,都不能成为我们放弃“做好人”的借口。The concept of a“good person”is structurally a trinity of knowledge,thought,and habit.One must have“knowledge”to“think”and,combined with practical experience to form appropriate habits,in order to become a“good person”.Whether in ancient or modern society,“being a good person”is not an easy task.Unlike specific virtues,“good person”is a concept of virtue origin that does not change with the transformation of social structures.The difficulty in being a“good person”is not related to the transition from traditional to modern society,but rather rooted in the inherent fragility and limitations of human beings.The reason we observe the cold reception of the“good person”concept in modern society compared to traditional society is due to the different trust mechanisms in each,with the former being ethical and the latter institutional.Regardless of the social form,the demands and dilemmas of being a good person are universal.However,neither the relational reasoning of traditional ethics nor the instrumental logic of modern institutions should serve as an excuse for us to give up on being a“good person”.

关 键 词：好人 传统 现代 做人 做好人 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]