天理与本体:从事实与物之分看朱熹形而上学的特质  

Tianli and Substance:Rethinking the Metaphysical Nature of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism through the Distinction Between Things and Facts

作　　者：路传颂 Lu Chuansong

机构地区：[1]西北大学中国思想文化研究所

出　　处：《哲学研究》2025年第1期68-80,171,共14页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：形而上学寻求经验事实的最终解释,亚里士多德的形而上学提供了对经验事实的本体或本质解释,程朱理学的形而上学则用天理解释经验事实。本体与天理分属不同的范畴,本体是没有命题结构的物,天理是具有命题结构的普遍必然的一般事实。程朱理学以普遍必然的一般事实解释特殊事实与归纳性的一般事实,这是一种根据解释。普遍必然的一般事实就是道理、法则,因此程朱理学的根据解释是一种演绎-律则学解释。但是由于程朱理学缺乏明确的事实概念,难免会将天理“物化”。在程朱理学中引入事实概念,有助于理解朱熹的理气关系论。Metaphysics seeks the ultimate explanation of empirical facts.Aristotle's metaphysics provides an ontological or essential explanation of empirical facts,whereas the metaphysics of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism explains empirical facts in terms of Tianli(天理).Substance and Tianli(天理)belong to different categories.Substance refers to a thing without a propositional structure,while Tianli(天理)refers to a general fact which is universal,necessary and equipped with a propositional structure.Cheng-Zhu NeoConfucianism explains particular facts and inductive general facts by means of universally necessary general facts,in this way constituting a ground-based explanation.Universal and necessary general facts are principles or laws;in this regard,the explanation in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism is a deductive-nomological explanation.However,due to the lack of a clear concept of fact,Cheng-Zhu School is prone to reify Tianli(天理).The incorporation of the concept of“fact”within the framework of Cheng-Zhu NeoConfucianism offers a valuable lens through which Zhu Xi's complex theory of the relationship between Li(理)and Qi(气)can be examined.

关 键 词：本体 物 事实 天理 程朱理学 

分 类 号：B244.7[哲学宗教—中国哲学]