中国新基金过度发行之谜和投资者保护  

Excessive Issuance of New Funds in China and its Implication on Investor Protection

作　　者：叶帅 张劲帆 郑凯轩 YE Shuai;ZHANG Jinfan;ZHENG Kaixuan(School of Management and Economics,The Chinese University of Hong Kong,Shenhen)

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院,广东深圳518172

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第9期171-188,共18页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文探讨了中国公募基金“重首发,轻持营”现象的深层次制度性原因和对于投资者保护的影响。中国公募基金行业募资主要靠发行新基金,平均每位经理管理2.7只基金。研究发现,大量发新的原因是,基金依赖银行渠道募资,必须向银行支付高昂的托管费。基金公司争夺银行渠道资源的方式是,发售一只新基金托管在该行,用托管费换取募资支持。对比同一基金经理管理的新老基金,新基金年化收益率平均优于老基金1.5%~2%;当一个基金经理发行新基金后,其管理的老基金表现下降。由于新基金的资金流入更加依赖其近期表现,基金经理有更强动机提升新基金业绩。大量发行新基金伤害了老基金投资者利益。同时,反复的赎回和申购也不利于基金经理管理,加剧了基金投资散户化倾向,最终影响整个基金行业的投资收益和资本市场稳定。At the end of 2021,Chinese mutual funds managed 25 trillion yuan and had over 9,288 funds.While the asset under management(AUM)is only 1/10 of that of the US mutual fund industry(34 trillion USD),the number of funds has already surpassed that of the US(8,840).The rapid growth of the Chinese mutual fund industry is primarily driven by new issuances,resulting in the fact that on average,a manager oversees 2.7 funds.One of the main factors contributing to this rapid fund issuance is the unreasonably high custodian fee that banks charge,which is 0.25%per year.Since banks are the primary sales channel for mutual funds in China,funds need to compete for the limited sales capacity of banks.Mutual fund companies can provide an extremely cost-effective incentive to issue a new fund that uses the bank as the custodian.This is cost-effective for the fund company because issuance costs are low and lucrative for banks.After all,once issued,the custodian bank cannot be changed,allowing the bank to receive all future custodian fees,which are high and almost cost-free.In exchange,the bank will give favorable allocation for the new fund.This distorted incentive structure results in managers overseeing an excessive number of funds,and managers may show favoritism among funds.We find that managers tend to favor new funds,with new funds outperforming old funds by an average of 1.5%-2%per year.Using a staggered DID approach,we show that when a fund manager issues a new fund,the performance of old funds declines significantly.Managers tend to favor new funds because investors'flow-return relationship exhibits a convex shape,and the flow-return relationship is more sensitive for new funds.Suppose a manager can generate a 10%return for the two funds under management or 15%for one and 5%for another.Convex flow-return relationship means that the latter can attract more flow,and new funds being more sensitive means that the 15%return will go to the new fund.We identify one possible channel that generates the gap between old and new funds:M

关 键 词：新发基金 基金托管 基金业绩 投资者保护 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]