职业经理人制度改革与国企规范运作——来自国企违规行为的经验证据  

Reform of the Professional Manager System and the Standardized Operation of State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from Violations

作　　者：罗昆 肖土盛[2] 高天宇 Luo Kun;Xiao Tusheng;Gao Tianyu(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Normal University,Wuhu;School of Accounting,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing;International Business School,Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing)

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学经济管理学院 [2]中央财经大学会计学院 [3]北京外国语大学国际商学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2025年第1期100-111,共12页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“企业数字化转型的赋能机制与赋能效果研究:基于人力资本结构调整视角”(项目编号:72272167);教育部人文社科研究项目“国企高管双轨薪酬契约与高管团队冲突:机理、证据与治理研究”(项目编号:21YJC630093)。

摘　　要：职业经理人制度改革是激发市场主体活力、弘扬企业家精神、促进国企高质量发展的关键举措。文章以国企职业经理人制度改革的推行为契机,用国企违规行为检验企业规范化运作,实证考察了职业经理人制度改革对国企规范化运作的影响。研究结果表明,职业经理人制度改革对国企违规行为具有明显的抑制作用,且主要通过强化监督治理和市场机制来实现。通过打开职业经理人制度改革“黑箱”,文章发现职业经理人制度改革的力度越大以及来自外部的职业经理人担任CEO时,对国企违规行为的抑制作用更强。进一步分析表明:在竞争类国企、市场化程度高的情境下推行职业经理人制度改革更能抑制国企违规行为;经济后果检验显示,职业经理人制度改革通过抑制国企违规行为,有助于实现国有资本保值增值。The reform of the professional manager system is a critical initiative to stimulate market vitality, foster entrepreneurship, and promote the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). This study examines the impact of this reform on the standardized operations of SOEs, using corporate violations as an analytical lens.The findings reveal that the implementation of the professional manager system significantly curbs corporate violations by enhancing supervision and market mechanisms. A deeper analysis indicates that the effectiveness of external professional managers as CEOs in restraining violations becomes more pronounced with stronger reform measures. Additionally, the reform yields better results in competitive industries and regions with higher levels of marketization.The economic consequences of the reform underscore its role in preserving and increasing the value of state-owned capital by mitigating corporate misconduct.

关 键 词：职业经理人制度改革 国企 违规行为 市场机制 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]