内部控制质量与高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究  

Research on Internal Control Quality and Sensitivity of Executive Compensation Performance

作　　者：赵进 孙宁 ZHAO Jin;SUN Ning(School of Management,Chuzhou Polytechnic,Chuzhou,Anhui 239000)

机构地区：[1]滁州职业技术学院管理学院,安徽滁州239000

出　　处：《绍兴文理学院学报》2025年第2期76-86,共11页Journal of Shaoxing University

基　　金：安徽省省级人才项目“大数据与会计专业带头人”(DTR2023083);安徽省省级质量工程项目“大数据与会计传统专业改造升级”(2022zygzsj041);安徽省省级质量工程项目“大数据与会计专业教学资源库”(2022jxzyk034);安徽省人文社科重点研究项目“大数据审计助力安徽省乡村振兴政策落实路径及对策研究”(2023AH053084)。

摘　　要：以上市公司的内部控制质量为出发点,研究其对企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,同时区分不同产权性质的企业内部控制质量对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。通过实证检验得到以下结论:高管薪酬与公司业绩呈正相关,且非国有企业相关程度强于国有企业;在其他因素不变的前提下,随着企业内部控制质量的提高,企业业绩与高管薪酬的相关性也会增加;与非国有企业相比,国有企业中内部控制质量与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的相关性更显著。Starting from the internal control quality of listed company,this article studies its impact on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance,while distinguishing the impact of different property rights of internal control quality on sensitivity of executive compensation performance.Through empirical testing,the following conclusions can be drawn:executive compensation is positively correlated with company performance,and its degree of correlation is stronger in non-state-owned listed companies than in state-owned listed companies;On the premise that other factors remain unchanged,as the quality of internal control improves,the correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation will also increase;Compared with non-state-owned listed companies,there is a more significant correlation between the quality of internal control and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in state-owned listed companies.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 高管薪酬 企业业绩 敏感性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51