高管股权激励对公司绩效的影响研究——以沪深A股上市公司为例  

Research on the Influence of Executive Equity Incentive on Corporate Performance:Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share Listed Companies as an Example

作　　者：黄叙 黄爱秋 HUANG Xu;HUANG Aiqiu(School of Accounting and Finance,Chengdu Jincheng College,Chengdu 611731,China;Chongqing Minglin Internet of Things Technology Co.Ltd.,Chongqing 400054,China)

机构地区：[1]成都锦城学院财务会计学院,成都611731 [2]重庆鸣琳物联网科技有限公司,重庆400054

出　　处：《科技和产业》2025年第6期299-305,共7页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：由于企业所有权与经营权相分离,管理者与股东之间的矛盾始终是加剧双方之间利益冲突的根本原因。为提高管理层对公司的忠诚度,防止管理层的短视行为,引导管理层最大限度地发挥个人才能,基于2014—2022年沪深A股上市公司数据,采用描述性统计、相关性分析、回归分析等分析方法研究高管股权激励与公司绩效之间的联系。研究发现,股权激励的实施具有双重意义。既能有效提升企业绩效,也能降低代理成本。Because of the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights,the contradiction between managers and shareholders is always the root cause of intensifying the conflict of interest between them.Equity incentive,as an effective medium and long term incentive mechanism for management,can alleviate agency problems and reduce agency costs,and is an important means to solve conflicts of interest.In order to improve the loyalty of the management to the company,prevent the short-sighted behavior of the management,and guide the management to maximize their personal talents,based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022,descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,regression analysis and other analytical methods were used to study the relationship between executive equity incentives and corporate performance.It is found that the implementation of equity incentive has dual significance.It can not only effectively improve enterprise performance,but also reduce agency costs.

关 键 词：高级管理层 股权激励 代理成本 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.5[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92