集体意向性中“我们”概念的还原与非还原之争  

The Debate Between the Reduction and Non-reduction of the Concept of“We”in Collective Intentionality

作　　者：李思楠 殷杰[1] LI Si-nan;YIN Jie(Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,太原030006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2025年第2期36-42,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“当代社会本体论问题研究”(20AZX005);国家社会科学基金重大项目“人类道德行为的进化与社会文化心理机制研究”(20&ZD039);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“大脑的本质与现代认知观研究”(18JJD720004)。

摘　　要：集体意向性作为一种意向形式仅发生在个体大脑之中,是一种琐碎的本体论共识。更为重要的问题是集体意向性作为一种现象,在哲学分析中应该如何概念化。在此问题上,还原论将第一人称复数“我们”作为第一人称单数“我”衍生的二级概念来保证解释策略的简洁性,使集体意向在本体论上成为一种个体意向的啮合网络;非还原论将“我们”视为不可还原的基本概念,以此保证集体意向与个体意向平等的本体论地位。从行动的规范性来看,非还原论可以更有力地解释社会行动中产生的权利与义务问题,以及在观察者的第三人称视角中,非还原论的解释策略具有独特的构成性特征与结果,从而保证了一定的实证价值。Collective intentionality,as a form of intention that only occurs in the individual brain,is a trivial onto⁃logical consensus.The more important issue is how to conceptualize collective intentionality as a phenomenon in philosophical analysis.On this issue,reductionism regards the first person plural“we”as a secondary concept de⁃rived from the first person singular“I”to ensure the conciseness of explanatory strategies,making collective inten⁃tion an engaging network of individual intentions in ontology.Non-reductionism regards“we”as an irreducible basic concept,thus ensuring the equal ontological status of collective intention and individual intention.However,from the perspective of the normativity of actions,non-reductionism can more effectively explain the issues of rights and obligations arising from social actions,and in the observer’s third person perspective,the explanatory strategy of non-reductionism has unique constitutive characteristics and results,thus ensuring a certain empirical value.

关 键 词：集体意向性 概念化 还原论 非还原论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]